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Abstract

The year 2004 marks the four hundredth anniversary of the Parol
Evidence Rule (“Rule”), the rule that dictates that the interpretation
of a written contract should be determined solely according to its text
and not influenced by prior contradictory external information. This
article uses this anniversary to offer a fresh interdisciplinary view of
the Rule. The analysis presents a unique contribution to the heated
debate regarding the desired levels of formalism and textualism in
present-day contract law by using New-Historicist tools.
Unexplored aspects of the roots of the Rule are illuminated
through an in-depth investigation of the first case of the contractual
Rule, the Countess of Rutland’s Case (“Case”).1 To examine the Case,
this article suggests the use of “Legal New Historicism”—researching
both human and non-human “actors” who played a role in the Case,
and re-narrating the story of Isabel, the Countess of Rutland. This
1. 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B. 1604).
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method reveals rare maps and romantic stories, which lead to a
critical look at the Rule’s total exclusion of context and helps to
expose its gendered nature.
This article further presents a close reading of the most influential
paragraph in Sir Edward Coke’s report of the Case.2 Coke’s words
and phrasing should not be read as incidental choice of language, but
rather as carefully planned and reflective of the dominant values of
the legal culture within which they were written. The choice to
exclude the context is far from a mere omission. It can be seen as
actively creating and then taking into account a manufactured
context—one that does not exist and is deeply patriarchal. An
exploration of the political and cultural contexts of Coke’s report
explains the possible motives for establishing the Rule and phrasing it
in such a manner. In the face of increasing threats, the Case played
an active role in Coke’s efforts to strengthen the diminishing status of
the Common Law as a component of a marketing project aimed at
improving the Common Law’s image without significantly changing
its content.
The Case is paired with an almost-twin contemporary case, Clark v.
Hannah-Clark,3 which resulted from a Hollywood scandal. Based
upon the juxtaposition of this new legal narrative of Nicolette
(Hannah-Clark) with the older story of Isabel (the Countess of
Rutland), this article concludes that the flaws and biases underlying
the Rule remain acute and call for a serious reconsideration of its
justification. In this way, this article offers an original, and hopefully
useful argument against excessive formalist textualism in present-day
contract law.
Nicolette
She lost her home.
The judge simply wrote that she “has no interest in that property,”4
but for her it was not merely “that property.” It was home, the place
where she had lived for more than ten years, ever since her son was
born, and she did have an interest in it—the father of her son gave it
to her.
So she appealed but failed again.5 Neither the legal logic of this
2. Id.
3. No. B157749, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 5058 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2003)
[hereinafter Clark II].
4. Clark v. Hannah-Clark, No. SC063529, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter Clark I] (quoting Judge John H. Reid’s words in this unpublished
opinion).
5. See Clark II, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 5058, at *12 (holding that Nicolette had
no interest in her home after she conveyed property to John Clark).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

3

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1

254

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:2

final decision nor its description of the facts could be reconciled with
the full story she knew too well. Yes, of course, she worked “for John
and Lynn, husband and wife, taking care of their young daughter,”6
but that was not the reason she lived at the little cottage nearby their
house. Why had the Judge not mentioned the undisputed fact that
she lived there because John, who once was her boss, became her
lover and the father of her child? Why is there no word about John’s
manifest insistence that she and their son live close to him while he
kept his marriage; no mention of his frequent visits to the cottage?
And what about the period of time when she had to move out from
the cottage until “it was improved with a paint job, a new carpet, and a
new heating and air conditioning system”7 due to its “bad
condition?”8 Despite the decision’s phrasing, the period between May
1997 and July 1998 was not simply a break in her continuous stay at
the cottage. This break led John to make an effort to bring Nicolette
and his child back. John made a deed transferring the cottage to her
in order to bring them back. As his wife Lynn had told the court, and
as he had admitted, John transferred the cottage to Nicolette “by
grant deed dated July 24, 1998” in order “to continue his contact”
with her and their son and “to prevent them from moving out again.”9
Nicolette and her son moved back to the cottage, this time as its
owners.
If the cottage was hers, how then did she lose it? Well, as both John
and Lynn told the court, gifting the cottage had severe tax
consequences for John.10 Upon realizing his error, John asked for
Nicolette’s cooperation by requesting that she give the cottage back to
him. He promised to transfer the cottage to her by “creating a trust
for [their son’s] benefit and placing the [cottage] in that trust.”11
Relying on John’s promise, Nicolette returned the cottage to him by
deed only five months after he had given it to her.

6. Id. at *2.
7. See Brief for Respondent John Clark at 2, Clark II, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS
5058 (No. B1557749) [hereinafter John’s Brief] (quoting John’s brief that was
submitted to the appellate court on November 22, 2002 in response to Nicolette’s
opening brief).
8. Id.
9. See Brief of Respondent Lynn Redgrave at 5, Clark v. Hannah Clark, 2003
Cal. App. LEXIS 5058 (No. B157749) [hereinafter Lynn’s Brief] (arguing that the
trial court properly quieted title in the name of John Clark and Lynn Redgrave
Clark).
10. See John’s Brief, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that when John realized that
gifting the cottage created a large gift tax, John planned “to take the house back
before the end of the year, and transfer it in the new year to his son Zachary by way of
a tax free irrevocable trust.”).
11. Lynn’s Brief, supra note 9, at 6.
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He never fulfilled his promise to create the trust.
She never recorded the promise in writing.
As a result, she lost her home.
INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing and heated debate in contract law regarding
the value of formalism, which entails loud calls for New Formalism.12
Part of this debate raises the question of textualism:13 to what extent
should the written version of the transaction be adhered (formalism),
and to what extent is there a place for considerations of fairness and
distributive justice and so forth (anti-formalism).14 The greater the
12. See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in
Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 499 (2004) (stating that this debate
has centered around the language of the “economic analysis of law”). New formalism
attempts to “ground formalism in functional terms” by showing how “formal methods
of interpretation help to forward practical goals such as efficiency, procedural
fairness, and public accountability.” Id. at 500; David Charny, Formalism in
Commercial Law: The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842-43
(1999) (observing that we are now in an anti-antiformalism phase which “calls for
reflection on the roll of formalism in the current understanding of contract law”);
Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
847, 851 (2000) (examining the role of courts using a formalist strategy which does
not preclude courts from functionally interpreting a contract).
13. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good
Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1229-30 (1999) (arguing that the textualism trend
threatens to cast aside from contract interpretation the important tenant of good
faith in contractual relationships and relying solely on the contract provides only a
“mere snapshot” of surface contractual relationships); Eric A. Posner, The Parol
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (outlining both the arguments
favoring the court’s reliance on extrinsic evidence when interpreting a contract and
arguments favoring the court’s exclusive reliance on the contract); Stephen F. Ross &
Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New
Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L. J. 195, 195 (1998) (noting that in
considering the legislative intent of a statute, the “New Textualist” movement
excludes extrinsic evidence such as floor statements, committee reports, and anything
not included in the text of the statute).
14. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 13, at 1230 (observing that institutional
values in the law of contracts arises from the premise that law should protect
fundamental expectations of good faith and reasonable conduct and that
performance of a contract in such a manner need not require an express contractual
agreement); Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance,
Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 700-01 (2001) [hereinafter Rough Justice]
(acknowledging that a tide of formalism is sweeping over contracts scholarship and is
reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, which narrows the coverage of
restitution and avoids a general notion of fairness because a legal justification is
preferred over a moral justification); Steward Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating
on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 775, 779-80 (2000) [hereinafter Relational Contracts] (praising the
works of Ian Macneil whose approach to understanding contracts reflects the actual
positions of parties creating contracts). For example, consumers seldom learn in
advance about warranty disclaimers or arbitration clauses, and they may not create
contracts to reflect these situations. Id. at 780. See also John E. Murray, Jr., Contract
Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 871 (2002)
(considering whether a new theory such as neoclassicism can better serve the social
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formalist-textual position, the stronger the belief in adherence to the
parol evidence rule.15
In this study, I will illuminate unexplored aspects of the parol
evidence rule, in a manner that challenges and undermines the
formalist-textual position from a new angle, namely a New Historicist
one. This unique point of view provides innovative ammunition for
the argument that excessive formalism may injure the weak.
Therefore, a more flexible and inclusive approach is required.16
I first read the story of Nicolette losing her home as it was
represented in the “official” judicial texts of both the initial and the
appellate decisions. It was a disturbing story, at least for a reader with
a chip on her shoulder.17 Back then, I did not know a thing about
the parties involved or about the Hollywood scandal that resulted
from these deeds. I did not realize that “Lynn” is actually the
celebrated actress Lynn Redgrave, or that “John” is the Hollywood
producer John Clark.18 It just sounded rather peculiar, even
unbelievable, that according to the law, all that happened was the
transfer of a $317,000 cottage as a mere gift followed shortly
thereafter by the “cancellation and return” of that same gift. 19 Many
questions came to my mind, but two of them were truly troubling: (1)
was the transfer really a gift, and (2) did she actually intend to return
it?
As to the first question, the first deed specifically emphasized that
John “received nothing in return.”20 Is this a truthful declaration? It
institution of contracts because case law does not currently reflect such new theories).
15. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 13, at 1233-34 (illustrating that based on
the parol evidence rule, the terms of a written contract are not to be varied or
supplemented by extrinsic evidence). In general, the Rule requires courts to
determine the intention of the parties based solely on the text of the document. Id.
However, the Rule is much more complex and this complexity was elegantly captured
by J. Thayer more than one hundred years ago. See James B. Thayer, The “Parol
Evidence” Rule, 6 HARV. L. REV. 425, 425 (1893) (noting that “[f]ew things in our law
are darker than [the parol evidence rule], or fuller of subtle difficulties”). Despite
the broad acceptance of the textualist nature of the parol evidence rule, the rule also
excludes textual evidence predating the integration of the written contract.
16. See, e.g., Relational Contracts, supra note 14, at 800 (“To the extent we
ignore custom and courses of dealing and performance, we reinforce the power of
the formal written contract. This, in turn, reinforces the power of those who draft
those documents, usually the lawyers who represent those with superior bargaining
power.”).
17. See MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 57 (Routledge 1992)
(explaining that the female version of a reader with a chip on her shoulder is upset
because of the vast mistreatment of women and this makes her read texts suspiciously,
constantly looking for clues that women will be denied justice).
18. The much-published Hollywood scandal may make the story more titillating,
but it could also give us a clue as to the power disparities between the parties in this
case.
19. Clark II, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 5058, at * 3.
20. Id.
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might be true if you are thinking in strictly monetary terms. It might
be sincere if you are willing to ignore the value of a beloved son who
lives nearby, as part of your family, a son who without knowing of your
blood connection was taught to call you “Papa.”21 As the jewel in the
crown of the market place, contract law is known for its obliviousness
to non-monetary aspects of life. I was, therefore, annoyed but not
surprised to learn how easy it was for the judges to embrace this
narrow definition of contractual consideration, and as a result, to
adopt the wording of the first deed as the whole truth and nothing
but the truth—that the transfer of the cottage was an honest
representation of a gift. Yet, this might be considered a marginal
issue, since neither of the two courts decided the case on the merits of
that first deed.22 They both were willing to assume that, for a short
while, Nicolette did indeed become the owner of her home. It is,
therefore, my second question and the second deed that turned out
to be crucial: had she or had she not intended to return the gift to
John?
I read the appellate decision again and found out that Nicolette
had tried to argue that the cottage was never meant to be returned to
John. I also read how the court immediately silenced her. The legal
tool that the court used to silence her emerges in footnote number
six of the appellate decision:
We observe Nicolette’s claim that she deeded the property back to
John in December 1998 in exchange for his promise to transfer the
property in trust to their son raises an issue as to the parol evidence
rule. As indicated, the December 1998 deed indicated it was a
“cancellation and return of gift,” which is inconsistent with Nicolette’s
position that she deeded the property back to John in exchange for
his promise to transfer it to their son.23

I was startled by the strict way the parol evidence rule enabled the

21. See John’s brief, supra note 7, at 2.
22. See Clark II, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 5058, at *12 (concluding the decision by
stating, “The [second] deed is dispositive because Nicolette therein reconveyed her
interest in the property”). “Therefore, it is unnecessary to address any contentions by
Nicolette relating [to] the [first] deed.” (emphasis added). Id.
23. See id. at *11 n.6. Note that this application of the parol evidence rule is
especially significant in light of the fact that California is most known for what Posner
named a “soft parol evidence rule” (roughly that of Corbin and the Second
Restatement of Contracts), as opposed to hard parol evidence rule (roughly the
Williston, four-corners, plain-meaning approach). See Posner, supra note 13, at 53435 (explaining that courts that apply the hard parole evidence rule look at the
completeness of the document “on its face” while courts applying the soft parole
evidence rule conclude that a document is complete only after looking at extrinsic
evidence); see also Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a Parol
Evidence Rule in California—The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 1213 (1995) (acknowledging that Corbin’s liberal view of the parol evidence rule asks
the trier of fact to make parol evidence determinations, whereas Williston’s
characterizes the rule more conservatively as a rule of substantive law for judges to
decide).
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courts to twice read the written documents so narrowly and to ignore
the details of this salacious story. Just as the court interpreted the first
deed as a gift for nothing, here again, it strictly followed the written
words of the second deed. The result was, to my eyes, a legal tale that
was in fact a castrated story. So many details were left out that the
court’s decision made no sense at all. My response was to search for
more information and to try to fill in some of the holes of this “Swisscheese” story. This is why I looked for the parties’ briefs; this is how I
learned that no one, not even John, denied that what the courts
viewed as a simple cancellation of a gift was in fact a much more
complicated arrangement, one that wholly contradicted the final
conclusion that Nicolette “has no interest in that property.”24
In its use of the parol evidence rule, the court willfully ignored the
voices that were trying to tell it what had actually happened. The
court disregarded not only the interested testimony of Nicolette but
also those declarations that had come from the opposing end of the
field, from both John and Lynn. As far as the second deed was
concerned, all three sides of this “romantic” triangle repeated the
same story. Despite the words of the deed noting a cancellation and
return of a gift, it was obvious that at the end of the day, the cottage
was not supposed to revert to John but instead to be transferred by
trust to Nicolette’s and John’s son. Naturally, each of the parties had
their own explanation as to the motives that caused John to break his
promise to create a trust,25 but everyone agreed that the words of the
second deed never reflected what was truly happening—everyone but
the courts, that is. The courts utilized the parol evidence rule as a
means of reshaping reality.
One might think that the use of the parol evidence rule as a legal
tool for preferring contractual text over a fuller context is a good
idea, and one might say that Nicolette is just a sad instance of a failed
litigation. I just could not. I was concerned by the missing and
misleading story, and I began to ask myself where and when such a
rule was born and decided to “hit the road.” My initial intention was
to go back in time in order to better understand the past of the parol
evidence rule. Ultimately, the journey became much more complex
and intriguing. I return with a novel perspective, one which proves
how contemporary the far past can be. What comes next is, therefore,
a report of my journey—a journey to the roots of the contractual
24. Clark I, No. SC063529, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2002).
25. See John’s Brief, supra note 7, at 3 (indicating that John was upset by
Nicolette’s alleged new amorous relationship with his plumber); see also Lynn’s Brief,
supra note 9, at 7 (substantiating that when Nicolette began her relationship with
Ernesto in 1998, John was upset and in December 1998, John and Nicolette
exchanged a series of “angry ‘love’ e-mails”).
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parol evidence rule, a journey not yet taken by others. The goal of
this report is to provoke fresh reconsideration of the aging parol
evidence rule.
In Part I, I describe the journey’s itinerary and elaborate on my use
of New Historicist and feminist methodologies. Having done this, the
actual journey begins and Part II focuses on the Countess of Rutland’s
Case26 that is considered to have established the parol evidence rule
four hundred years ago, in 1604. This part tells two versions of the
Case’s story: first the formal and thin account, and then a thicker
description of what appears to have happened. An analysis of the
significance of the remarkable disparity between these two versions
concludes the section, highlighting the gender bias that is entailed in
the legal decision to ignore the thicker version, i.e. the context. Part
III offers a close reading of the most influential paragraph in Sir
Edward Coke’s report of the Case. Coke’s words, I suggest, should
not be read as incidental choice of language but should instead be
seen as carefully planned and, as such, reflecting the dominant values
of the legal culture within which they were written. Accordingly, Part
IV focuses on the political and cultural contexts of Coke’s report.
Here, Coke’s words are read in light of his broader legacy and in line
with his other writings about the law in general and contract law in
particular. Considered in this way, the Case plays an active and
productive role in Coke’s efforts to resist the amassing threats to the
Common Law: the admiration of Roman law, the use of oaths, and
the need to distinguish law and lawyers from the common people.
Building on this idea, I propose that the Case can be viewed as a
component of a marketing project aimed at enhancing the Common
Law’s popularity by offering a new and improved image of the same
old product without significantly changing its real identity. This
section ends with a comparison between Coke’s marketing efforts and
the labors of Shakespeare’s Portia to gain authority in court. The
comparison emphasizes the artificial nature of the parol evidence
rule, and the Conclusion calls for a serious reconsideration of the
Rule’s necessity after four hundred years of an unveiled attempt to
exclude real-life from the contractual interpretation process.
I. THE JOURNEY’S PLAN
A. Taking the New Historicist Trail
My vehicle during this journey is going to be a New Historicist one.
For most scholars “New Historicism” is a literary practice aimed at
26. 77 Eng. Rep. 89, 89 (K.B. 1604).
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interpreting literary texts with culture in mind.27 Although used
outside of the fictional arena and most famously by the anthropologist
Clifford Geertz, whose works on “culture as text” inspired the literary
New Historicist high-tide,28 New Historicism is seldom used in legal
works.29 While I strongly believe that what I here name “Legal New
Historicism”30 is a promising critical method, I think that its rarity
necessitates further development and discussion. Nevertheless, at this
stage I will resist the temptation to do so and instead try to better
explain my specific choice to apply New Historicism to the contractual
parol evidence rule.
First, the Rule seems to the American legal mind as a given, and
although many have spent time debating its extent, only a few have
questioned its very existence. My turn to New Historicism is therefore
an attempt to focus on this latter question of existence. Here, this
practice can offer the option of de-familiarizing what is taken for
granted by taking a closer look at the times of birth and the critical
27. See generally STEPHEN GREENBLATT, RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING: FROM
MORE TO SHAKESPEARE (University of Chicago Press 1980) (establishing Greenblatt as
the founder of “New Historicism” and initiating “New Historicism” into literary
studies).
28. Much of this inspiration came from Clifford Geertz’s celebrated book,
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (Basic Books 1973). See also
CATHERINE GALLAGHER & STEPHEN GREENBLATT, PRACTICING NEW HISTORICISM 28
(University of Chicago Press 2000) (indicating that Greenblatt and Gallagher were
struck not only by Geertz’s method but also by the lived life that he narrated and
described with clarity).
29. See Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the
Possibility of Equity, 14 CARDOZO STUDIES L. & LIT. 520 (2002) (arguing that New
Historicism should not be viewed as a new requirement in analyzing the law). But see
William W. Fisher III., Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal
History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1084
(1997) [hereinafter Fisher, Texts] (acknowledging that in American legal history,
only Hendrik Hartog’s two essays conform to the methodology of New Historicism);
Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trails of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L. J. 109, 119 n.23 (1998) (comparing the role of
law in culture as studied in local cultural rituals and by New Historicist literary critics);
Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899, 899 (1985) (exploring the
practice of pig-keeping in nineteenth century New York City in developing a study on
the legal significance of American customs); Hendrik Hartog, Mrs. Packard on
Dependency, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 84-85 (1988) (examining the legal
dependency that common law imposes on married women in the nineteenth
century).
30. Compare Fisher, Texts, supra note 29, at 1065 (utilizing the name “New
Historicist Legal History” as a phrase that encompasses a methodology for studying
American legal doctrine and legal thought from a historical perspective), with Guyora
Binder and Robert Weisberg, The Critical Use of History: Cultural Criticism of Law,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1997) (believing that “cultural criticism of law” and New
Historicism merged into the field of “Cultural Studies”). Binder and Weisberg
contend that “Cultural Studies” blurs the boundaries between the humanities and the
social sciences because phenomena studied by social scientists (including historians)
are viewed as social texts available for interpretation and criticism). I prefer to entitle
the application of New Historicism to law as Legal New Historicism since I see its
general critical potential one that is not limited to the legal-history arena.
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moments of emergence, the transference from non-existence to
existence.31
Second, despite its procedural name, the parol evidence rule
influences the substantive question of contractual interpretation.
Such interpretation becomes highly textual as the Rule bans
unwritten data, and the interpretative tool of New Historicism
therefore seems especially appropriate to the project at hand.
Highlighting this linkage between interpretation and the New
Historicist practice, Geertz noted in a recent interview:
When I work in the field on anything, whether it’s something sort
of airy-fairy like religion or something more concrete like a market,
I start with the notion that I don’t understand it. Then, I try to
understand it better by tacking back and forth between large and
little things. And that’s what you really do when you “interpret.”32

The main object of interpretation in this paper is the Case, where it
is believed the parol evidence rule was “born.” This Case serves, in
New Historicist terminology, as the “textual unit” or as the “cultural
text” under investigation. I use the legal report of the Case in a way
similar to Geertz’s use of his own field reports: as a textual unit, “an
imaginative act;”33 a “made, composed, fashioned” 34 thing, one
which is no less suitable to literary criticism than the fictions that are
part of the literary western canon. Indeed, the way Geertz, as an
anthropologist, interprets his exemplary texts (his notes) is parallel to
the way the legal reporter interpreted a legal case in England four
hundred years ago. Both the anthropologist and the reporter can be
compared to writers and the texts they composed can be read as
“embedded in the cultures from which they come”35 and as texts that
“possess within themselves more and more of the culture’s linked
intentions.”36 My aim is thus to offer a “thick description”37 of the
31. See GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 28, at 26 (demonstrating that this
“closer look” has been described as “something akin to what in optics is called
‘foveation,’ the ability to keep an object . . . within the high-resolution area of
perception”). In the cultural interpretation of “foveation,” “the interpreter must be
able to select or to fashion, out of the confused continuum of social existence, units
of social action small enough to hold within the fairly narrow boundaries of full
analytical attention, and this attention must be unusually intense, nuanced, and
sustained.” Id.
32. John Gerring, Interview with Clifford Geertz, in QUALITATIVE METHODS:
NEWSL. OF THE AM.POL. SCIENCE ASS’N ORGANIZED SEC. ON QUALITATIVE METHODS 24,
26 (Fall 2003).
33. GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 28, at 27.
34. Id. at 28.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 23 (showing that the term “thick description” does not refer to the
length of the description). It derives from the philosophical works of Gilbert Ryle
who in his essays on thinking used it with regard to description, which “entails an
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legal report that brought us the contractual parol evidence rule, and
to attempt to understand the imaginative universe within which the
act of reporting this case was a sign.
Third, a critical look at the parol evidence rule, with its insistence
on the autonomous nature of the contractual text and its rejection of
non-textual materials, requires critical tools that address the specific
phenomenon of textuality. Again, New Historicism seems apposite,
for its roots lie precisely in strong resistance to literal criticism, which
rigidly adopts a highly textual approach, namely new-criticism. The
New Historicist focus on anecdotes as a powerful vehicle in the search
for meanings, in plural, seems extremely useful here. These
anecdotes constantly cross and blur the lines of relevancy, lines
between inside and outside, center and margins, main and
subordinate, lines which the parol evidence rule fiercely tries to
establish and maintain.
Fourth, it is meaningful that the parol evidence rule was founded in
the last days of Queen Elizabeth’s reign and the first days of King
James’s reign, the early-modern times of Tudors and Jacobeans. This
period, with the plays of Shakespeare at its core, served as the nursery
for the development of literary New Historicism,38 and thus could
naturally be revisited by the same method—this time with law, instead
of literature, in mind.
account of the intentions, expectations, circumstances, settings, and purposes that
give actions their meanings.” Id. at 23.
38. See generally THE NEW HISTORICISM (H. ARAM VEESER, ed. 1989). See also
Walter Cohen, Political Criticism of Shakespeare, in SHAKESPEARE REPRODUCED: THE
TEXT IN HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY 18 (Jean E. Howard & Marion F. O'Connor eds.,
Methuen 1987) (analyzing the Shakespearean period in terms of feminism, new
historicism, and Marxism). See generally JONATHAN GOLDBERG, JAMES I AND THE
POLITICS OF LITERATURE (John Hopkins University Press 1983); Jonathan Goldberg,
The Politics of Renaissance Literature: A Review Essay, 49 ELH 514 (1982), Jonathan
Goldberg, Recent Studies in the English Renaissance, STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE,
1500-1900, at 157 (1984) (reviewing Renaissance period literature); Stephen
Greenblatt, Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and Its Subversion, Henry IV and
Henry V, in POLITICAL SHAKESPEARE: NEW ESSAYS IN CULTURAL MATERIALISM 18-19
(Jonathan Dollimore & Alan Sinfield eds., Manchester University Press 1985)
(evaluating whether charges of atheism against Thomas Harriet, an Elizabethan
mathematician, are true); STEPHEN GREENBLATT, SHAKESPEAREAN NEGOTIATIONS
(1988) (analyzing late sixteenth century works); Richard Helgerson, The Land
Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, and Subversion in Renaissance England, in
REPRESENTATIONS 16 (1986) [hereinafter The Land Speaks] (discussing the historical
significance of Christopher Saxton’s collection of country maps); Jean E. Howard,
The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies, in ENGLISH LITERARY RENAISSANCE 13
(1986) (explaining “new history” as evaluating literary texts of the English
Renaissance in relation to other aspects of social formation in the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries); Louis Adrian Montrose, Of Gentlemen and Shepherds: The
Politics of Elizabethan Pastoral Form, 50 ELH 415 (1983); Edward Pechter, The New
Historicism and Its Discontents: Politicizing Renaissance Drama, 102 PMLA 292
(1987); Don E. Wayne, Power, Politics, and the Shakespearean Text: Recent Criticism
in England and the United States, in SHAKESPEARE REPRODUCED: THE TEXT IN HISTORY
AND IDEOLOGY 47 (Jean E. Howard & Marion F. O'Connor eds., 1987).
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Last, and apropos Shakespeare, New Historicism gives various texts
the ability to converse or to participate in the cultural discourse of
their time. It is under this New Historicist umbrella that I offer this
kind of conversation between the chief text—the 1604 legal case—
and Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. To use the words of
Catherine Belsey, the fictional text of Shakespeare could “offer
definitions and redefinitions which make it possible to reinterpret a
world we have taken for granted.”39
These five factors I have just outlined join together in one typical
New Historicist desire, which is to explore how the old, long-forgotten
textual unit that engendered the parol evidence rule was both
culturally produced and culturally productive. This desire is grounded
in the belief that New Historicism “entertains the possibility that any
social or political document can be read not only instrumentally but
also aesthetically, as describing the cultural forces that underlie its
production and as reinterpreting cultural forms and norms.”40
B. Turning onto the Feminist Path
In western culture and since the days of the Odyssey, a journey has
been a masculine undertaking: Odysseus went away and Penelope,
well, she waited at home. So my planned journey is in itself a feminist
method. But in what other ways is a New Historicist journey
connected to feminist voyages? I think it all starts with the use of
“anecdotes” against the hegemonic order of things,41 as a way of
producing counter-narratives. To grasp this subversive spirit, listen to
the New Historicists describing themselves by saying, “the
undisciplined anecdote appealed to those of us who wanted to
interrupt the Big Stories. We sought the very thing that made
anecdotes ciphers to many historians: a vehement and cryptic
particularity that would make one pause or even stumble on the
threshold of history.”42 For feminists seeking ways to expose and
resist male dominance, which is often so axiomatic by nature, these
words represent a powerful potential. No wonder that “[s]ome of the
legal scholars most interested in the promise of New Historicism are

39. Catherine Belsey, Disrupting Sexual Difference: Meaning and Gender in the
Comedies, in ALTERNATIVE SHAKESPEARES 190 (John Drakakis ed., Methuen 1985).
40. GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 477-78
(Princeton University Press 2000).
41. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th
ed. 2000) (defining “hegemonies” as “[t]he predominant influence, as of a state,
region, or group, over another or others”), available at http://dictionary.
reference.com/search?q=hegemonic (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
42. See GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 28, at 51.
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feminists.”43
Feminist works44 and New Historicism share not only the impulse to
resist hegemony, but also elements of methodology.45 Among these
are the tendency to avoid grand theories, the attempt to refrain from
abstract models and a zealous search for “the touch of the real,”46 the
connection to lived experiences which are patronizingly excluded
under the general rules of hegemonic disciplines. These are the
methodologies I will now attempt to employ.
II. THE COUNTESS OF RUTLAND’S CASE
A. The Thin Version
The Countess of Rutland’s Case is considered to be the origin of
the contractual parol evidence rule.47 According to this belief, the
rule was born in 1604, making it exactly four hundred years old. Now
is a good occasion to celebrate, but also a suitable time for
reconsideration. Even though the general principal that emerged
from the Case was much quoted and is still quoted today,48 few

43. See Judy M. Cornett, Hoodwink’d by Custom: The Exclusion of Women from
Juries in Eighteenth-Century English Law and Literature, 4 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN
& L. 1, 7 (1997).
44. But see Linda E. Fisher, I Know It When I See It, or What Makes Scholarship
Feminist: A Cautionary Tale, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 439, 440 (2003) (addressing
the problem of essentialism using a narrative style).
45. See Judith Lowder Newton, History as Usual? Feminism and the “New
Historicism,” in THE NEW HISTORICISM 152, 152-53 (H. Aram Veeser ed., 1989)
(defining New Historicism as “a set of assumptions and techniques given different
articulation depending on the politics of the practitioners”). Newton also critiques
New Historicism for not being attentive enough to gender biases. Id. at 155.
46. See GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 28, at 20.
47. See Friedrich Kessler et al., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 823 (3d ed.,
Aspen Law & Business 1986) (stating that the parol evidence rule was designed to
preserve the security of transactions); see also Charles T. McCormic, The Parol
Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 366-67
(1932) (indicating that one’s memory of words spoken several months before is
subject to a high degree of error); D. W. MCLAUCHLAN, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 12
(Professional Publications, Ltd. 1976) (stating that the parol evidence rule arose
because of the court’s respect for the written word); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 899-900 (1985) [hereinafter
Jefferson Powell] (explaining that at common law, courts construed contracts
strictly). Contracting parties were presumed to have understood the cannons of
construction when drafting their contracts. Id. See MICHAEL R.T. MACNAIR, THE LAW
OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQUITY 138 (Duncker & Humblot 1999) (reporting that
courts generally exclude evidence of parol agreements that alter the terms of a deed).
See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Theory Informs Business Practice: The Written
Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Bank of Credit and Commerce Imternational Small v. Munawar Ali,
(Appeal to the House of Lords decided on March 1, 2001), available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldjudgmt/jd010301
/credit-1.htm [hereinafter BCCI decision].
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individuals are aware of its particulars.49 One main reason for this is
that the reports of the Case provide an extremely brief and slim
description of what happened, what the parties pleaded, and what the
court decided.50 The first and better known report, written by Sir
Edward Coke, is less than two and a half pages long51 and the second,
written by Sir George Croke, is only half a page.52 However, the
length of the texts is not the only problem for someone who seeks the
legal story with its specifics. Croke’s text does not tell us the facts at
all and concentrates only on the legal principals upon which the Case
was decided. Yet, even through Coke’s longer text—which does state
the facts—one finds it hard to grasp what the Case was all about,
especially when trying to read this text today, from a distance of
centuries. Other than “technical” barriers to the modern reader, such
as the use of Law-French, “a totally artificial language,”53 it seems that
the text itself is cryptic to the point of being almost incomprehensible.
It is a report of a case that refrains from telling us, perhaps refuses to
tell us, a story.
The little that is possible to know from simply reading Coke’s report
is that Isabel, the Countess of Rutland and the widow of Edward, the
third Earl of Rutland, sued Roger, the fifth Earl of Rutland. At the
heart of these legal proceedings stood a manor called Eykering House
and additional land of unclear nature named the “Lady Park”54—both
located in “the county of Nottingham.”55 It appears from the thin
description in Coke’s report that the Countess blamed the Earl “for
breaking her house and close,”56 but no further details are provided
regarding this occurrence. There is no hint as to the nature of this
breaking, but we are informed that the Earl’s response was “not
guilty.”57 We are then told (in a very complicated manner) that the
dispute between the Countess and the Earl arose from a conflict
between two written contracts that were both made by the late Edward
49. One important exception is Prof. Michael Macnair whom I deeply thank for
sharing his knowledge with me.
50. See J.H. Baker, Records, Reports, and the Origins of Case-Law in England, in
JUDICIAL RECORDS, LAW REPORTS, AND THE GROWTH OF CASE LAW 21 (1989)
[hereinafter Baker, Records] (demonstrating, as one of the most prominent
contemporary authorities on English legal history, the early development of law
reporting as a movement from record to report).
51. See Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 89.
52. Countess of Rutland v. Earl of Rutland, Croke Jac. 30, 79 Eng. Rep. 23.
53. W. H. Bryson, Law Reports in England from 1603 to 1660, in LAW REPORTING
IN BRITAIN 113, 121 (Chantal Stebbings ed., 1995).
54. See Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 89.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Earl of Rutland with regard to the property, i.e. Eykering House and
the Lady Park. In the first contract Edward covenanted (contracted
by deed) with several trustees that he would convey to them the
property in order to ensure his own and his wife’s use of the property,
during their life together. The covenant went on to say that if he,
Edward, died first, then his wife, Isabel, would have the right to use
the property for the rest of her life. According to this covenant, it was
only after the Countess’s death that the property was supposed to fall
into the hands of Edward’s heirs, who where represented by Roger,
the current Earl of Rutland.
More than half a year later, the same Edward made another written
contract. This later contract dealt with a much larger parcel of land,
which contained many properties including Eykering House. This
time the list of trustees was longer and they were supposed to make
sure that the specified lands, including the disputed property, were
transferred in male-tail only, which means from Edward directly to his
male heirs without any rights whatsoever to be given to Isabel the
Countess.
With regard to Eykering house and the Lady Park, the question was
thus which of the two contracts should govern: the first, which would
enrich the Countess, or the second, which would supplement the
current Earl’s fortune. Importantly, the witnesses’ testimony came
into the picture not as an independent source of information separate
from the writings, but as a support for one of the two rival documents.
As Coke’s report tells us, “it was proved by diverse witnesses, that the
said Earl Edward . . . told them, that the said countess should have the
manor of E[ykering] for her jointure.”58 It appears that no one
knows for sure whether Isabel, the Countess, or Roger, the Earl, won
the Case. What is known through the reports is only the directory to
the jury made by the judges. Coke reported that Chief Justice
Popham, together with the court, set the general rule that a written
deed will bar parol evidence. Coke reasoned that, “it would be
inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the
agreement of the parties should be controlled by averment of the
parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery
memory.”59
Ironically, the first parol evidence rule case was not decided upon
this general rule and in fact, the court instructed the jury to hear the
58. Id. at 89-90.
59. See id. at 90; see also Jefferson Powell, supra note 47, at 948 (applying Coke’s
reasoning to understanding “interpretive intention” of the framers of the
Constitution).
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witnesses despite the presence of a written deed. The reasoning
behind this outcome has its roots in the Early-modern legal way of
conveying land and is difficult to explain based on Coke’s report
alone. In the early seventeenth century, the declaration of a trust was
only the initial step in the process of gaining the landowner’s control
over the future of his properties. In order to finalize the transaction,
a further (and crucial) step was needed. Edward, the grantor of the
property should have, in Coke’s words, “acknowledged” his obligation
to the trustees and the beneficiaries by executing a suitable “fine.”60
A fine was an artificial and fictional legal practice in which the people
who were supposed to receive land sued the grantor of the land. In
practice, such a suit was not litigated but, instead, a settlement was
achieved and approved by the courts. In order to constitute a valid
contractual obligation, this settlement had to be congruent to the
primary deed and that is exactly where the two deeds in our Case
failed. Although Edward did “acknowledge” both his first specific
deed and his second more general one, on two consecutive days, it
seems that “the fines actually levied were inconsistent with either
deed.”61 Presumably, it was because of these special circumstances
that the judges decided to allow parol evidence.62 However, as I note
above, the Case is better known for its setting of the general rule
forbidding the parol evidence than for its concrete conclusion to
allow such evidence in the dispute resolution at hand.
To sum up the thin version of the story, we could say that Isabel and
Roger held contradicting documents that gave each of them the
exclusive rights to Eykering House. In addition, Isabel had several
witnesses who supported her claim and the court allowed hearing
them as an exception to the more general rule that it had just
penned: the parol evidence rule. This is indeed a poor story: who are
these people, what were they fighting over and why, what is, or at least
might be, the explanation for such great inconsistencies between the

60. See id. at 90.
61. See MACNAIR, supra note 47, at 139 (emphasis added) (explaining that the
inconsistency of the fines made it necessary for parol evidence to be presented). The
fine regarding the first deed was levied after the deadline set in the deed, while the
fine regarding the second deed was probably levied without mentioning the Eykering
house. Id. Support for this may be found in Moore’s report regarding the Countess’s
unsuccessful attempt to litigate the same matter in the Wards. Id. See also Sir Francis
Moore, Le Countee de Rutland’s Cafe [sic] (K.B. 1592), in CASES COLLECT & REPORT
723, 724 (2d ed. 1675) (“Another fine was levied of the other lands, but not of
Eckering to the persons named in the second indenture . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Note the French-like name of the case, which nicely demonstrates the Law-French
phenomenon. Id.
62. These special circumstances also disrupt the chronological order of prior and
later between the two written documents, an order which might have been crucial, at
least under a modern parol evidence rule.
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legal devices? In the next section, I will deal with these questions by
sketching a thicker version of the story.
B. A Thicker Version
1. The Main Characters
In constructing a thicker version of the Case, I will first focus on its
three main characters. Viewing both humans and non-humans as
active “actors” in the emerging plot, I will then continue with the
disputed land itself, and conclude the review, briefly, with two
additional minor characters. I will open with Isabel, the Countess of
Rutland who gave the Case its name.
However, it is worth
emphasizing that researching a female figure, especially one from the
Early-Modern times, is a much more complicated task than collecting
information on her male counterparts.
a. Isabel Manners
Isabel was born in Vale Royal in Cheshire on an unknown date, to
Julian Jennings and Sir Thomas Holcroft.63 As such she did not
originally belong to the English aristocracy of her time, a fact of great
importance to our story. Isabel joined the nobility via her marriage to
Edward Manners, the third Earl of Rutland, in 1573, by which she
became the Countess of Rutland.64 While married to Edward, Isabel
enjoyed a luxurious life. She resided mostly in the lavish Belvoir
Castle at that time—the residence of the Earls of Rutland and the seat
of the Dukes of Rutland in our time. Her journey to London with her
husband in 1586 involved “forty-one servants, including a chaplain,
trumpeter, gardener, and apothecary.”65
In 1575, Isabel and Edward’s only child, a daughter named
Elizabeth, could not be the heir to most of the family’s estates
according to the rules of the period.66 After Edward’s death, the fact
that he and Isabel had no male heir to inherit most of the family’s
properties created a serious and ongoing conflict between Isabel and
his male heirs. So bitter were the relationships that Isabel’s brother
63. See LAWRENCE STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE: STUDIES IN ARISTOCRATIC FINANCE
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 173 (Clarendon Press 1973)
[hereinafter STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE].
64. Id.
65. THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, Vol. XII 993 (Sir Leslie Stephen et
al. eds., Oxford University Press 1917) [hereinafter DNB].
66. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 174-75 (explaining that
Edward left Elizabeth a total of seventeen manors, two rectories, and a London House
in Saint Andrews Undershaft but adding that this property amounted to only one
quarter of the total estate).
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in-law, John, Edward’s younger brother, who became the fourth Earl
of Rutland, tried to prevent her from receiving what was clearly
promised to her under her late husband’s will. John claimed that the
huge payment for Edward’s funeral should first be paid in full out of
Isabel’s share.67 Isabel had to sue her brother in-law and seemed to
have won, if only partially, when arbitrators decided the issue, among
them Lord Burghley, an important figure in our thickening story.
John’s revenge was to try to take Isabel’s custodial rights over her
young daughter, maintaining that her bourgeois ancestry made her
an unsuitable guardian for a great lady.68 Evidently, Edward’s male
heirs were extremely unhappy about his decision to marry Isabel,
especially since they had to support her throughout her widowhood
after she contributed little, or nothing, to the family’s fortunes.
However, it is quite clear that it was the lack of a son that required
Isabel to fight so desperately for her rights; just as she had to do
later—in the Case with which we are dealing—against John’s son
Roger, the Fifth Earl of Rutland.69
b. Edward Manners
Edward Manners, the third Earl of Rutland, was born in 1549 to an
aristocratic family and was the eldest son of Henry, the second Earl of
Rutland. When he was fourteen years old his father died and he was
made one of the Queen’s wards under the close charge of Lord
Burghley. It was this powerful man who took care of the young boy’s
fine education in “Oxford, Cambridge, and possibly Lincoln’s Inn”
and indeed Edward was later described as a learned man and a
profound lawyer.70 His legal talents were so remarkable that the
Queen appointed him, on April 12, 1587, to the distinguished
position of Lord Chancellor, a title he held for only a few days until
his sudden death.71 During his life, Edward showed both business
skills and administrative abilities, and the Earldom of Rutland was

67. See Anastasia B. Crosswhite, Note: Women and Land: Aristocratic Ownership
of Property in Early Modern England, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1119, 1132-34 (2002)
(arguing that John had ill will towards Isabel because she was one of two dowager
countesses drawing substantial jointures from the Rutland estate, leaving him
considerably poorer than his predecessors).
68. See id. at 1134.
69. See Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 89 (noting that Eykering was
to pass to Edward’s son, but in the absence of a male heir, pass to his brother).
Because Edward’s will left a considerable amount of property to Elizabeth, Isabel’s
only daughter, the will created a hostile atmosphere as the male heirs stood to lose a
considerable amount of property. Id.
70. STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 173.
71. Id. at 173.
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described as flourishing under his hands.72
A salient feature of Edward’s profile was his decision to marry
Isabel. In a society obsessed with status and hierarchy, as Tudor
England was, marriage was a key issue. Far from contemporary
romantic images associated with the idea, marriage had a highly
functional and pragmatic role, especially for members of the
aristocracy. What was perceived as “good marriage” had little to do
with love or with the quality of the relationship of the spouses.
Instead marriage was about social rank, political power and, above all,
property. The decision of whom to marry was seldom a matter of
individual choice but rather a crucial part of a familial strategy. One
major objective of marriage was the acquisition of property and the
creation of political alliances.73 In other words, in those days of
“arranged marriages,” the groom and his family married both the
bride and the bride’s family.
Other than the obvious aspirations to promote the family’s status by
means of the “proper” wedding, two additional factors played a role in
shaping this familial perception of marriage, both of them tightly
connected to our story. The first was the dowry: the considerable
amount of property, or cash money (“portion”) that was transferred
from the bride’s family to the groom’s family in order to facilitate the
marriage. In return for that fortune the bride was guaranteed an
annual sum to support her in the event of widowhood, or a jointure—
a term which plays an essential role in the Case. The burden of
financing the daughter’s dowry was heavy enough to make it a
rational strategy for the whole family to cautiously choose its recipient.
The wealth and the trustworthiness of the potential groom’s family
were relevant both in terms of the security the jointure would assure
the bride and in terms of the ability of the bride’s family to pay for the
marriages of its other daughters as well.
The second factor was the primogeniture, a principal according to
which the eldest son in each family inherited all its assets. The other
children, both daughters and younger sons, were economically
dependant on their father or on their father’s sole heir, their elder
brother. This principal contributed immensely to the importance of
the eldest son’s marriage since in each family he was the one with the
better upward mobility chances—he was more likely to marry a
wealthy bride accompanied by a hefty dowry that would add to the

72. Id. at 174 (noting that Edward controlled every aspect of his property). He
managed the property, he farmed the property, and he modernized the Rievaulx
ironworks. Id.
73. LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 42
(Harper Torchbooks c.1977) [hereinafter STONE, FAMILY, SEX, MARRIAGE].
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family assets and would suffice to cover the portions of his sisters.
It was against this concrete background that Edward decided to
follow his heart and to marry Isabel. Taking into account the cultural
and economic forces of the period sheds light upon such a decision
and enables us to better comprehend its meaning. As the eldest son
of his most respected aristocrat family,74 Edward’s marriage was of
utmost importance and yet it appears he assumed the freedom not
only to marry far beneath his social rank, but also to upset his family’s
expectations of a substantial dowry. For one thing, this marriage is
presumed to have been considered, at the time, a mésalliance,75 “a
union between two people that is thought to be unsuitable or
inappropriate.” 76 More than that, Isabel’s mother claimed “that the
Earl was so deeply in love that he was willing to marry the girl even
without a marriage portion.” 77
But Edward’s marriage was more than mere noncompliance with
the cultural norms of his time.78 It seems essential to understand that
he preferred Isabel to several other brides, far more appealing in
terms of money and position, and furthermore, had put his very
future at risk (and consequently that of his younger siblings as well).
As mentioned earlier, when Edward married, his father was already
long dead and his future, as well as all of the family’s estate, was
controlled by William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the powerful guardian of
the Elizabethan aristocracy.79 Despite his general obedience to his
74. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at xv (choosing the Manners
as one of the few families with which his book deals, Lawrence Stone writes that “all
the examples are drawn from the very topmost ranks of the aristocracy, an élite within
élite, members of a group which in France was known as ‘Les Grandes’”). Later,
Stone goes on to present the Manners as a family that “rose suddenly in the late
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to become one of the leading members of the
country’s great landed aristocracy.” Id. at 165. After describing the massive
acquisition of land by Thomas, the First Earl of Rutland, Stone adds, “The result of
this gigantic investment in real estate was to make the Manners family a major social
and political force both in the north midlands, in Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire
and Lincolnshire, and also in the north, in Yorkshire.” Id. at 167.
75. Id. at 173.
76. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2001, available at http://dictionary.oed.com
[hereinafter OED] (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
77. STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 173 (emphasis added) (stating
that this claim might be honest since, in Stone’s words: “No marriage contract has in
fact survived, so there is no means of knowing whether or not the Earl obtained a
substantial cash sum on his marriage with Isabel on 1573”). My own correspondence
with the representatives of Belvoir Castle supports the above conclusion of Stone
regarding the lack of marriage contract.
78. But see THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF CHRISTOPHER HILL (VOL. 3): PEOPLE AND
IDEAS IN 17TH CENTURY ENGLAND 203 (1986) [hereinafter HILL] (criticizing the
assumption that love before marriage was rare at the end of the sixteenth century).
79. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (showing that since Lord
Burghley was included in the text of Coke’s report, I will discuss his character in more
detail below).
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influential guardian,80 Edward refused Burghley’s suggestion to marry
his daughter, an offer that few would have dared to decline and many
would have loved to accept.81 The exceptional nature of Edward’s
decision to marry Isabel should, therefore, be viewed in a multilayered
way, taking into account its many dimensions that, combined
together, reinforce the impression that this rare marriage could only
have been based upon love.82
c. Roger Manners
The fifth Earl of Rutland and the defendant in our Case was born
in 1576 as the eldest son of John, the aforementioned fourth Earl of
Rutland who fought so bitterly against Isabel. When his father died,
Roger was still underage but wealthy enough to induce Lord Burghley
to engage himself in a fierce contest over the young Earl’s ward. This
contest was won by Burghley, previously Edward’s guardian and now
entrusted by the Queen with the custody over another Earl of
Rutland, Roger.83 One of Burghley’s first moves as a warden was to
order Roger’s mother, Elizabeth, to send Roger back to Queens’
College in Cambridge, where he was educated for many years. The
tension between Burghley and Elizabeth was so acute that Roger had
to ask his permission to visit his own mother.
So different from his talented late uncle Edward, Roger seems to
have been a big disappointment to his mentor, both in terms of
education and business skills. While tracking the young Earl’s
expenses Stone notes: “Though he did buy a Livy, it is noticeable that
it was in translation, and his very limited expenditure on books
suggest a young man of some natural intelligence but who had failed
to master the classics and whose main interests lay elsewhere.”84
80. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 172-73 (describing Edward
as one of the most obedient and grateful wards of Lord Burghley, a fact that makes
his refusal to marry his mentor’s daughter even more significant).
81. See DNB, supra note 65, at Vol. XII, 934 (suggesting that Edward married
Isabel after negotiating with several other ladies). Years later, Edward insisted his
daughter to marry upwardly, a command she obeyed by marring Lord Burghley’s
grandson, Sir William Cecil, the second Earl of Exeter. Id.
82. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 173 (detailing that Edward,
despite disapproval, married Isabel without a “portion”); see also Crosswhite, supra
note 67, at 1133-34 (noting that Isabel was supposed to inherit Newark Castle, its
demesnes, and her own inheritance from her mother).
83. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 177.
84. See id. at 179. Titus Livy (59 B.C. to A.D. 17), the famous Augustan historian,
was born in the Northern Italian city of Padua and his History of Rome was and still is
one of the most popular pieces of classical literature. But compare Stone’s
conclusion to an opposite view of Roger made by those who view him as the actual
author of Shakespeare's works. See ILYA GILILOV, THE SHAKESPEARE GAME: THE
MYSTERY OF THE GREAT PHOENIX (Gennady Bashkov et al. trans., 2003) (offering the
most comprehensive work that supports the thesis that the Fifth Earl of Rutland and
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Roger was quite adventurous and spent a lot of time traveling the
world, probably more than he could afford as the head of the
Earldom. When Roger was not even twenty, and shortly after his
mother’s death in 1595, Lord Burghley approved his journey to the
continent—but wrote bluntly that the young Earl knew very little
about his estate.85 It was in Paris, toward the end of his “Grand Tour”
in 1597, that he first met the Earl of Essex, an acquaintance that
would have enormous influence on his life as well as an interesting
effect on our legal story.86 Charmed by Essex, Roger followed him to
the Azores and continued to ignore the rising need for his
involvement in his family’s businesses.
In the years that followed, Roger is described as a reckless spender
who would, for instance, pay huge amounts of money for princely
clothing. According to Stone, his “rate of expenditure was almost
certainly higher than that of any other private individual in the
country.”87 That irresponsible attitude, combined with the need to
pay for his sisters’ marriages led Roger and his dependants into a

his wife were responsible for Shakespeare’s works and citing earlier works that
suggested the same conclusion.)
The general argument is that Roger was
Shakespeare because, among other things, his life parallels that of Shakespeare's life
as presented through the Plays. For instance when Roger had studied at Padua
University in 1596, two of his fellow students were Danish noblemen named
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern “and several years later they lent their names to two
inseparable courtiers” in Shakespeare’s “Hamlet”. Id. at 87. Later Roger was sent by
King James to Denmark, and after he came back the original version of the same play
(known as Quarto 1) was changed and extended. Remarkably, the revised version
(known as Quarto 2) reflects a more realistic description of Denmark. Id. at 286-89.
See also JOHN MITCHELL, WHO WROTE SHAKESPEARE 211-22 (1996) (weighing the
evidence scholars have presented to support the claim that Roger wrote some or all of
Shakespeare’s works and concluding that the events in Roger’s life give credibility to
their theory).
85. See DNB, supra note 65, at vol. XII, 940.
86. See id. at vol. V, 875-90. (showing that Robert Devereux, the second Earl of
Essex (1566–1601) was an English courtier and favorite of Queen Elizabeth I).
Succeeding to the earldom on the death of his father, he too (like Edward and Roger
Manners) came under the guardianship of Lord Burghley. Id. When he returned to
England after serving as a cavalry officer under Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, he
soon became a marked favorite of the queen. Id. at 876. Essex became a national
hero when he shared command of the expedition that captured Cádiz in 1596, but he
failed the next year in an expedition to intercept the Spanish treasure fleet off the
Azores. Id. at 879-81. In 1599, at his own demand, he was made Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland and sent there with a large force to quell the rebellion of the earl of Tyrone.
Id. at 883. Failing completely to accomplish his mission, he made an unauthorized
truce with Tyrone and returned to England. Id. He was confined by the Council,
and it was eight months before he was tried for disobedience by a special council and
deprived of his offices (1600). Id. at 885. He was soon released but was banned from
the court. Id. Still popular, Essex planned a coup that would oust the enemy party
and establish his own about the queen. Id. To this end he sought support from the
army in Ireland and opened negotiations with James VI in Scotland, but these efforts
failed. Id. at 886.
87. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 180.
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severe economic crisis that lasted from 1601 to 1606,88 significant
years in the legal fight with Isabel. There can be no doubt that in
those years, Roger found himself under heavy financial pressure. He
had to borrow large sums of money for a mortgage and was also
quoted as requesting Royal help stressing “the weakness of my estate
and greatness of my debts.”89
What had deepened the crisis even more was Roger’s involvement
in the Essex revolt, for which the Privy Council fined him the
enormous sum of £30,000.90 This incident, further proof of his
impulsive nature, was not only an economic disaster but also one of
Roger’s most serious mistakes. As mentioned above, Roger was one of
Essex’s admirers and close friends. As a result, on February 8, 1601,
when Essex called his supporters for help, Roger did not hesitate and
immediately gathered around Essex’s house.91 It is worth mentioning
here that Lord Essex’s relationship with Queen Elizabeth had just
reached its lowest point ever. Only months after Sir Edward Coke—as
one of Essex’s prosecutors for his Ireland fiasco—dared to blame the
Earl for disloyalty, the Queen was ready to follow him and distrust her
favorite Earl. New indications arose and she was now even more
convinced that Essex was indeed plotting against her.92 When the
88. See id. at 184 (explaining that only by 1606 Roger resolved the worst of his
financial difficulties which were created during his youth).
89. Id. at 184.
90. Id. at 182.
91. See ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE ELIZABETHAN AGE 280 (2003)
[hereinafter BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE] (writing that after Essex attempted to conquer
Ireland, he returned home to either assassinate the Queen or beg for her mercy but
when she realized he had no army, she had him attested). Following Essex’s
disgraceful failure in Ireland, he was put under house arrest until the Queen released
him. Id. at 280. Then two major events occurred: the first was the completion of the
legal proceeding against Dr. Hayward who wrote a history book about a king who was
deposed and murdered for his ill governance. Id. at 277-88. It was Coke who forced
a confession out of Hayward and who wanted to use his dedication to Essex in order
to bring charges against the Earl as well. Id. at 279. In the end, no charges were
formally brought, but the Queen ordered the renewal of Essex’s house arrest. Id. at
279-80. The second event was the special performance of Shakespeare’s Richard II,
on Saturday February 8, 1601, an event that was organized on Essex’s behalf and paid
for by his aides. Id. at 286. Richard II, written around 1595, is the first play in
Shakespeare's second “history tetralogy,” a series of four plays that chronicles the rise
of the house of Lancaster to the British throne, which closely parallels Essex’s life and
rebellion against Elizabeth I. Id. Richard II, who ascended to the throne as a young
man, is a regal and stately figure, but he is wasteful in his spending habits, unwise in
his choice of counselors and detached from his country and its common people.
When Richard departs to pursue a war in Ireland, his cousin, Henry Bolingbroke
assembles an army and invades England. Id. The commoners welcome this invasion
and Richard's allies in the nobility desert him to defect to Bolingbroke's side as he
marches through England. Id. By the time Richard returns from Ireland, he has lost
control of his country. Id. Bolingbroke is crowned King Henry IV while Richard is
imprisoned in a remote castle. Id. The Queen is known for saying later: “I am
Richard the Second, know ye not that.” Id. at 287.
92. Id. at 276-80.
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Privy Council sent for Essex to question him, Essex claimed to be ill
and refused to come.
“No sooner was the messenger gone than the Earl received an
anonymous note, warning that he was in danger and had best provide
for himself. Essex sent out runners over the city; all night they spread
the alarm . . . .”93 It was in response to this alarm that Roger was
waiting at dawn in front of Essex’s house, together with several other
Earls and hundreds of gentlemen. He was standing there, on this
Sunday morning, when a special and much respected mission sent by
the Queen arrived at the courtyard. Among them was Chief Justice
Popham—the leading judge in our Case. As if to prove the Queen’s
suspicions, Essex led his honorable guests to his library and . . . locked
them in!94 He then left home and ran to the streets waving his swords
and yelling “For the Queen, for the Queen!”95 His aim was the royal
palace, but to Essex’s grief, not many were willing to risk themselves
and join him and his small group of followers, Roger included.96
After a violent encounter with a few soldiers Essex fled back home by
boat, only to discover that his hostages were gone. “By midnight,
Essex was in prison and his friends captured: the Earls of
Southampton and Rutland; the Lords Sandys, Monteagle, Cromwell;
Sir Gilly Merrick . . . Desperate men; ruined men, now, scattered in
prisons throughout the city.”97
On May 19, 1601, Essex was brought to trial and his prosecutor was
none other than Coke, who bought himself worldly glory through this
trial. Preparing himself for his big performance, Coke wrote himself
lengthy notes which indicate how central Roger’s involvement was
perceived to be.98 At a crucial point in the trial, Coke called Chief
Justice Popham as a witness, and “[w]rapped in the majesty of judicial
scarlet, Popham stepped from the bench and stood waiting for the
first question.”99 Popham testified in detail not only about his
traumatic imprisonment, but also about things he heard while
crossing Essex’s courtyard on the way to his house.100 It is probable,
93. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
SIR EDWARD COKE: 1552-1634, at 132 (1956).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 133.
97. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
98. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 281 (“‘Traitors’ names’, Coke
writes in the margin of his memorandum, and begins taking examinations. The Earl
of Rutland, Bridget Paston’s cousin, confides in his kinsman.”) (first emphasis in
original; second emphasis added).
99. BOWEN, supra note 93, at 149.
100. Id.
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therefore, that he also recognized our Earl of Rutland standing there
on this Sunday morning.101 By the end of this long day of legal
hearings, Essex was found guilty of treason and was beheaded.
The Earl of Rutland was more fortunate. His life was saved, but he
suffered a substantial fine, larger than that of any of Essex’s other
followers, a fact that serves as a further indication of just how seriously
his contribution to the plot was perceived. Based on a gloomy
description of his financial plight, this fine was later reduced to
around £18,000. The remainder was never enforced and was finally
cancelled by King James.102
d. The Disputed Land—Eykering House and the Lady Park
Bruno Latour has explained how non-human objects may play an
important role in a story.103 Inspired by such theories,104 it seems
valuable to take a detour to Nottinghamshire, England, where the
manor over which Isabel and Roger fought once stood. What was
named in Coke’s report of the Case as “Eykering” is to be found today
in Eakring—a village in the center of Nottinghamshire.105 “Eykering”
was indeed one of the several spellings of this place’s name, a spelling
that apparently evolved from the Old-Norse origins of the name as
“Eikhringr,” meaning a ring of oaks.106 It is unclear exactly how and
when this property came into the Manners’ hands, but in the
Doomsday survey of 1086, Eakring was listed as Echering and most of
the village and its lands were divided between two manors.107 One of
101. This might have influenced his decision against Roger in our Case and could
explain the puzzling exception to the newborn parol evidence rule.
102. STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 183.
103. See Bruno Latour, How To Write The Prince for Machines as Well as for
Machinations, in TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROCESS 20, 28 (Brian Elliot, ed.,
Edinburgh University Press 1988) (suggesting that "it is precisely when turning
towards the non-human elements [material artifacts] that the polemical, controversial
and strategic discourse should increase, not decrease").
104. See Thomas F. Gieryn, What Buildings Do, 31 THEORY & SOC'Y 35, 35 (2002)
(arguing that buildings both stabilize social life and are subject to wrecking balls or
discourse); see also Pierre Bourdieu, The Kabyle House or the World Reversed, in
ALGERIA 1960, at 133 (Richard Nice trans. 1979) (one of the most renowned works
about buildings).
105. There has been a great variation in spellings over the centuries, all of which
were pronounced as “Aykering.” The pronunciation has changed only in recent years
to match the modern spelling.
106. Old Norse is the language spoken and written by the inhabitants of
Scandinavia around 1000 A.D. and earlier. The modern Nordic languages of
Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Icelandic and Faroese descended from Old Norse. The
original Old Norse “Eik-hringr” dates back to the mid-ninth century when the Danish
settled in the English Midlands.
107. THE DOOMSDAY BOOK is a great land survey from 1086, commissioned by
William the Conqueror to assess the land and resources owned in England at the
time, and the amount of taxes he could raise. The information collected was
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these manors was handed down through the Eakring family, the
Lexingtons, the De Suttons and finally, the De Roos family, which
merged with the Manners and became the Earls of Rutland.108
Most attractive for our purposes is the fact that in 1604—the year of
the Case—Eakring itself was subject to a special survey performed by a
gentleman named Henry Caldecott who, with the assistance of some
tenants of the same manor, drew beautiful plans of the place and its
surroundings.109 This survey allows us a rare peek at the disputed
territory as it looked four hundred years ago. But the survey does
much more: it sheds light on the term “Lady Park” as it appears in
Coke’s report of the Case, and it also gives us a serious clue regarding
the unknown result of this Case.
Let us start from the end. The plans that resulted from this survey
do not mention Isabel, the Countess of Rutland, in any way. Instead,
at the bottom of the plan that depicts the manor itself there appear
words of explanation:

recorded by hand in two huge books which provide extensive records of landholders,
their tenants, the amount of land they owned, how many people occupied the land
(villagers, smallholders, free men, slaves, etc.), the amounts of woodland, meadow,
animals, fish and ploughs on the land and other resources.
108. See Email from Mr. Derek Walker, Chairman of the Nottinghamshire Local
History Association, to Hila Keren (Mar. 24, 2004) (on file with the author)
(suggesting that the merge of the Manners with the De Roos family was accomplished
via the marriage of Eleanor Ros and Sir Robert Manners); see also STONE, FAMILY AND
FORTUNE, supra note 63, at 165 (adding that the above marriage occurred in 1469
and was the way the “[m]anners transformed from remote Northumbrian squires to
landed magnates of the north-east midlands”). Compare to infra note 122 and
accompanying text (showing that since there were only forty-four years to Elizabeth’s
reign, it is possible that the Eakring estate only came into the hands of the Earls of
Rutland years later when, in 1539, Gertrud Manners, the eldest daughter of Thomas
the first Earl of Rutland, married Sir George Talbot of the De Roos family).
109. See HENRY CALDECOTT, SURVEY OF THE EAKRING MANOR OF 1604 (Terrier of
Eakring with plans, DD.SR 227/17). The original plans are kept in Nottingham
Archives and reprinted here with permission.
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The manoure of Eykringe in the Countie of Notinghm being parcel
of the possessions of the righte honorable Roger Earle of Rutland
Lorde of the same Manoure. Surveyed the fifte daye of Julye.
1604.110

These words, written in the same year as the judicial decision in our
Case, suggest that it was Roger who ultimately won the legal battle as
well as the disputed land.111 Further evidence for Roger’s victory,
110. See id.
111. Note that the legal basis for such supposed victory is still unknown. The Case
ends with guidelines to the jury but no one seems to know what happened later. At
any rate, what happened later had probably to do more with the question of who won

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/1

28

Keren: Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of the Parol Ev

2005]

THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE WITH GENDER IN MIND

279

albeit less conclusive, is the fact that it was he who sold the manor to
others.112
Other than “Eykering House,” the manor house referred to in the
above quote with its associated lands, the dispute in the Case
concerned an additional item called the “Lady Park.” It is impossible
to know why “Lady Park” warranted special reference in the Case and
was not simply considered part of the Eykering House, especially since
it was close to the manor house (or “Hall”) itself.
However, the same survey from 1604 provides us with a picture of
this mysterious “object.” This magnificent illustration of the park
portrays an enclosed land full of tiny sketches of trees.

As shown in the plan above, the Lady Park was adjacent to what is
titled in the plan as “Eykringe pasture Leyes” and lay just over a mile
from the manor itself. At the lower right-hand corner of the plan, an
economic analysis is offered, reprinted here with no change of
spelling:
The Ladie parke is a woodgrounde, and the wooddes therin are
lately solde, so that little profitte is to be made thereof by woodsales
for manye yeres. Therfore in my opinion it were good to stubbe the
moste p[ar]te thereof & convert it to pasture. So that thereby

the juries sympathy (or who “bought” it) than it had to do with legal arguments. I
thank Professor Macnair for the last point.
112. ROBERT THOROTON, THE ANTIQUITIES OF NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 198 (John
Throsby's ed., enlarged ed. (1790-96), Vol. III) (The manor was probably sold to the
Marquess of Dorchester).
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present profitte maye be made, And the rather for that it is to be
kepte enclosed continuallye.113

The information provided by this text gives us reason to suspect
that due to the sale of all its wood, the Lady Park’s value decreased
significantly during the years between the making of the indentures
and the legal debate regarding their meaning.
Having understood what the “park” was, we now turn to the “lady”
that gave it its name. One of the most appealing and symbolic
possible explanations is that Isabel was not the first wife to receive this
land from her husband and that the park was given to one of the
Ladies in past generations as a morning gift, a gift given to the bride
by her newly wedded husband in exchange for her loss of virginity
upon the consummation of their marriage.114 One possibility may be
that this part of the estate was given to Gertrud Manners upon her
marriage to George Talbot in 1539.115 Support for this may be found
in an indenture made by Gertrude’s father, Thomas the first Earl of
Rutland:
An Indenture between Francis Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury and
Thomas Manners, Earl of Rutland, whereby the former leaves to his
son George, Lord Talbot, on his marriage with Gertrude, daughter
of the latter, the Manor of Rufford, the Lordship of Ekeryng, with
lands in Rufford, Ekeryng and Kirketon. Co. Nottingham.116

Another charming possible explanation for the “lady” in “Lady
Park” concerns female deer hunters. It seems that the term “Lady
Park” did not appear until Elizabethan times and may have referred to
the Queen herself. It was accepted that the monarch, invariably a
man up until the time of Elizabeth’s sister, Mary, and Elizabeth
herself, took part in the exercise of hunting and particularly in the
hunting of deer. But this was a very physical activity for which a
woman was notconsidered suited, and so the “Lady Park” developed
whereby Elizabeth and her ladies would sit in carriages and the deer
would be driven past them, allowing the ladies comfortable aim at the
deer. This activity became fashionable in Elizabethan times and could
explain why the name does not appear earlier in Eakring. The
Eakring Park was quite small and perhaps particularly suitable for this
113. See CALDECOTT, supra note 109. The original plan is kept in Nottingham
Archives and is reprinted here with permission.
114. See Email from Mr. Derek Walker, Chairman of the Nottinghamshire Local
History Association, to Hila Keren (Dec. 30, 2003) (on file with the author).
115. See id.
116. See Email from Mr. Derek Walker, Chairman of the Nottinghamshire Local
History Association, to Hila Keren (Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with the author) (stating
that the indenture is dated 32 Hy.VIII (the thirty-second year of King Henry’s reign,
i.e. 1540/1541). The original document is kept in the Nottinghamshire Archives
Office as a Savile of Rufford deposit: DD.DR 207/338.
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type of hunting. Taking all this into account, it is probable that Isabel
hunted in this style in the Rutlands’ Lady Park at Eakring.117
On a more general note, it is interesting that the findings of the
1604 survey seem to indicate that the overall size of the Eykering
House, together with its surrounding lands, was 1,015 acres
(including land held by tenants), a relatively modest estate in view of
the Rutlands’ vast possessions at the time.
2. The Minor Characters
a. Lord Burghley
Lord Burghley appears in our story explicitly in the second written
indenture, where Edward names him, among others, as responsible
for the transference of a long list of properties to his male heirs.
Indirectly, as we have already seen, Lord Burghley was heavily involved
with the Manners in many ways and hence it seems worthwhile to try
and learn more about him. Born in 1520 as William Cecil, Lord
Burghley was highly educated in what was at that time the best college
in England: St. John’s College in Cambridge. Curiously, in a way that
might remind us of Edward Manners’s marriage to Isabel, he married
a woman of “slender means”118 against his father’s will after the
failure of his father’s ambitious plan to prevent this by moving him to
another university.119
Cecil became one of Queen Elizabeth’s chief advisors for decades.
Upon her accession to the throne, she immediately made him Chief
Secretary of State,120 a position he held until 1572, whereupon he was
made the Lord Treasurer until his death in 1598.121 Despite the fact
that Elizabeth was not generous in creating new peerages,122 she
raised her loyal advisor to the peerage in 1571 giving him the title of
Lord Burghley—a decision that reflects well the power he gained in
the days of the Elizabeth’s reign. Authors describe Lord Burghley as
the most influential man in the Elizabethan era.123 In the context of
our story, it may be enormously important to understand the audacity
and impact of Edward’s decision to refuse to marry this dominant
117. Email from Mr. Derek Walker, Chairman of the Nottinghamshire Local
History Association, to Hila Keren (Mar. 25, 2004) (on file with author).
118. See DNB, supra note 65, at Vol. III, 1315.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1317.
121. Id. at 1319.
122. There were only fifteen new creations in her forty-four years of reign.
123. See, e.g., ANNE SOMERSET, ELIZABETH I, 62-64, 279, 519-520 (Knopf 1991). See
generally CONYERS READ, LORD BURGHLEY AND QUEEN ELIZABETH (Knopf 1960).
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man’s daughter, as well as the extraordinary and high value of the
eventual marriage of Edward’s daughter to Burghley’s grandson.
b. Gilbert Gerard
Sir Gilbert Gerard’s name appears on both of the contradictory
indentures, a peculiarity that did not escape Coke’s attention.124
Thus, it is important to explore Gerard’s connection to the Manners
and the legal skills he brought to his responsibilities under these
documents. In this regard, it is significant to learn that Gilbert
Gerard and Isabel were first-cousins: his mother, Margaret Holcroft,
was the sister of Isabel’s father. In addition, his co-trustee to the first
indenture was Thomas Holcroft, Isabel’s brother, which our Case
notes as Edward’s “brother” with respect to his relation as a brotherin-law.
Furthermore, Gerard received a fine legal education at Gray’s Inn
and his legal reputation was so exceptional that Elizabeth nominated
him to the influential position of Attorney General soon after her
accession.125 Thirty-seven years later she would nominate Coke, the
reporter of our Case, to the same influential position.126 In 1581,
Gerard climbed another step up the legal ladder of the times in
attaining the position of Master of the Rolls—an office he held until
his death in 1593.
3. Wrapping-up the Thicker Story: The Outlawing of Context
The thicker story sketched above adds some context to the slim text
of the report of the Countess of Rutland’s Case, a context so absent
from Coke’s description. Going back to the central question of the
two conflicting indentures made by Edward Manners, it now seems
more evident that the context of the Case speaks loudly for the first
124. In an edition of Coke’s Reports from 1826 Coke printed a remark next to one
of the appearances of Gilbert’s name stating: “note, Sir Gilb. was party to both the
indentures.” See THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT. [1572-1617] IN THIRTEEN
This rare edition is kept in the Robbins
PARTS (Butterworth and Son 1826).
Collection of the Law library of University of California, Berkeley. The Case is
included in a chapter titled “Cases of Covenants, Agreements &c. concerning Leases
Assurances &c.”
125. See DNB, supra note 65, at Vol. VII, 1097 (stating that Gerard “never took the
degree of serjeant-at-law” due to his appointment as Attorney General).
126. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 252-53 (noting that Coke
described the Attorney-General office as:
one of the greatest, and largest, concerning the possessions of the Crown, an
extraordinary place for the preservation of the King’s royal prerogatives, and
inheritances, so that by this diligent care, he may increase them, and by the
neglect of his duty, he may more diminish them than any of his Majesty’s
ministerial office).
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indenture, which promised the land to Isabel. The indications are
numerous, and I will only point out a few. Edward, a very talented
and experienced legal professional, took the legal effort of making a
specific indenture that was dedicated to Eykering—one relatively
small and marginal property among the many assets of the prosperous
Manners family. For the purposes of this indenture, he particularly
chose respected trustees from his wife’s family and entrusted them to
make sure that his beloved wife, for whom he was willing to risk so
much during his lifetime, should have an adequate jointure for her
widowhood. He did so knowing that he had no son and that his wife
would most likely be dependent upon the mercy of his male heirs. He
calculated that these heirs could not be trusted to care enough for his
wife’s welfare, not only because the responsibility for jointures was
viewed in those times as an economic disaster, but also because of his
heirs’ antagonism towards Isabel due to her inability to contribute to
the family’s fortunes upon their marriage. The choice of Eykering of
all the family’s properties can be seen as a conscious decision on
Edward’s part. Eykering, being a not-too-important asset, was still an
asset that could provide a decent income for his widow through the
sale of wood from the Lady Park and the collection of rent from
tenants.
We cannot be sure, of course, but Edward may have simply made a
mistake when he included the same property of Eykering House and
the Lady Park in the two different and conflicting documents. In
light of Edward’s vast legal and business talents, such an error seems
more plausible than the possibility that he consciously created
conflicting indentures. All of the above circumstances would seem to
support the supposition that he never meant to include this special
property in the later and much more general document.
In this same context, we can also find support for the possibility that
Roger’s fight over Eykering did not necessarily arise from any solid
belief in his legal right but from a desperate economic situation and
an urgent need to get rid of an excessive burden of jointures.127
Given all the indications as to Roger’s general irresponsibility, it seems
plausible to assume that his “breaking” of Isabel’s house was a hasty
attempt to deal with his financial crisis by making use of the presumed
weakness of his widowed rival.
The gap between Coke’s version of the story and the thicker version
as presented here is remarkable. This gap emphasizes the terse
nature of the legal report and suggests that its slimness was
127. See Crosswhite, supra note 67, at 1138 (indicating that because Isabel
possessed a strong claim to jointure based on Edward’s will, Elizabeth used the
jointure to reduce the amount owed to Lady Roos and her heirs).
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intentional. A possible response could point to the general manner
in which law reports were written in Coke’s time. This kind of
response would, of course, explain the fact that Coke’s text is
oblivious of its context. But, as I will now argue, Coke’s text not only
refrains from the context, but it also consciously and bluntly resists it.
Coke’s text could and indeed should be read as a text about texts:
their importance, their supremacy and their desired reign. Of the
two reporters of the Case, only Coke reported Judge Popham to say:
“Also it would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by
advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain
truth of the agreement of the parties should be controlled by
averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of
slippery memory.”128
These words reflect much more than a pro-textual approach, and
upon close reading, their anti-contextual attitude is evident. The
alternative to the written text is the unreliable “slippery memory” of
witnesses, and an apocalyptic warning follows:
“And it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers, and all
others in such cases, if such nude averments against matter in writing
should be admitted.”129
From this choice of strong words such as “dangerous” and “nude” it
seems that the author’s purpose is to elevate the text to sanctity and to
eliminate entirely any other contradictory information. We can grasp
the deliberate effort made here to outlaw context if we remind
ourselves of the facts of the Case, which involved two incompatible
documents and not a clash between written text and competing
(risky) testimony.
One immediate lesson that can be learned from the thicker version
of the story, the one that includes context, is that at the beginning of
the seventeenth century, the act of establishing a legal rule that
crowned text and expelled context was a truly hegemonic act. Back
then, the contractual text was totally inaccessible to women, and only
the wider context could disclose their gendered reality and
inferiority.130 Concerning the availability of the contractual text to
women in those days, several points are worth mentioning. First,
women were in general far less literate and educated than men.
Second, women’s literacy was confined for the most part to the wellto-do women, and those who were lucky enough to be able to read
were usually directed to readings of “female-literature” such as
128. Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90.
129. Id.
130. Of course, some (but not all) of the limitations were also a product of low
socio-economic background, not only gender.
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romances, plays and poetry.131 Third, there was no way an earlymodern Englishwoman could earn the legal education that would
enable her to comprehend, let alone write, a contract. And fourth,
according to the rule of coverture, a married woman could not even
be a passive side to a contract, such as signing it without reading it,
because she had no legal entity of her own.132
This last point brings us directly to the gendered impact of
rejecting context. Not only insignificant details were left out by
focusing only on the text. Rather, as Isabel’s Case beautifully
demonstrates, it was for the most part the patriarchal nature of the
story that was excluded: Isabel’s inability, as any other married
woman’s inability, to hold or control personal property, necessitating
third-party contractual arrangements; the difficulty in enforcing these
arrangements and fulfilling the intent of a husband who sought to
bypass patriarchal inheritance rules in order to secure the future of
his wife; the strong resistance to brides who could not bring along
hefty dowries; and finally, the need to fight for jointure lands against
powerful male heirs of the patriline. Hence, the Case shaped a rule
that decidedly gives the text ultimate control even when the
interpretation of the contract/s at issue has, even if unknowingly, a
strong patriarchal meaning.
To get a better sense of this patriarchal nature of the Case, we can
attempt to track Isabel’s voice. She is first silenced due to her absence
from the contractual text as a result of her marriage and her
mergence into her husband’s person. She then gains a distinct voice
as a plaintiff through her new status as a widow that allows her to
appear in court, and as a result, in the report’s text. But still, her
voice could not be heard since the English seventeenth century law of
evidence excluded the parties themselves from the witness stand.133
Instead, others, namely the “divers witnesses,”134 speak for her and
represent her voice as coming from outside the text. And here is the

131. See STONE, FAMILY AND SEX, supra note 63, at 143 (noting that during the
seventeenth century, the traditional feminine activities needed to find a husband
such as playing music, singing, dancing, needlework, and embroidery replaced the
literary education for noble women).
132. See id. at 136 (explaining that by marriage, the husband and wife became one
person at law, the husband). The husband acquired absolute control of the wife’s
assets, but he also became responsible for her debts. Id.
133. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 349 (4th ed. 2002)
[hereinafter BAKER, INTRODUCTION].
134. See Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 89-90 (indicating that the
divers witness said that Earl Edward had told them that Elizabeth should have the
manor of Eykering).
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catch: their voices, which are a poor variation of hers, are ridiculed as
the unbelievable result of their “slippery memory.”135
From a contemporary perspective, the above analysis may produce
two chief conclusions regarding the nature of the parol evidence rule.
On the one hand, we see how the rule was “born in sin,” as Coke’s
text about the supremacy of contractual texts did indeed create a
chauvinistic act. On the other hand, the historical reality that made
the rule so female-excluding to begin with has so changed by the
beginning of the twenty-first century that one might argue that what
was born in sin is now purified and, hence, sustainable. But is it?136
To address this question I feel I should “go smaller” again and analyze
the details of the text that supposedly constituted the parol evidence
rule while paying attention to the specifics of the rule’s creation. 137
III. CLOSE READING OF THE TEXT
One specific paragraph of Coke’s report has been quoted
repeatedly through the centuries as constituting the modern parol
evidence rule. As these words have remained influential long after
the litigation that led to their writing was forgotten, it is important to
look at them more closely:
[I]t would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice
and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of
the agreement of the parties should be controlled by averment of
the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery
memory. And, it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers,
and all other in such cases, if such nude averments against matter in
writing should be admitted.138

Several characteristics of the newborn rule are evident even from its
wording alone: the rule’s aspiration to separation, hierarchical nature,
alleged rationality, claim to certainty, and pro-market orientation.
Together, as I will now further explore, these characteristics portray a
highly masculine profile based upon common stereotypes of men

135. See id. at 90 (stating that to admit the testimony from the divers witnesses
would harm purchasers and farmers).
136. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 106 (1991)
(discussing negative answers from the feminist perspective); Judith L. Maute,
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille,
89 NW. U. L. REV. 1341, 1412-16 (1995). However, these responses are based on the
current American form of the parol evidence rule where mine concentrates on
exposing its older English roots.
137. See generally MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW'S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE
(2003).
138. Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90.
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while alienating traits that are usually (and stereotypically) associated
with femininity.139
A. An Aspiration to Separation
By separation, I mean the assumption that the written text of the
contract can and should be separated from all that surrounds it. The
above quote from our Case divides the world into two groups: the first
is “matters in writing,” a phrase which appears twice in this short
paragraph, and the second group, “averments,” which also appears
twice.140 It is easy to identify “matters in writing,” given the tangible
nature of the written words; it is much more difficult to grasp what
stands against it, under the term “averments.” Literally, the last term
refers to the action of proving the truth, and etymologically, it comes
from Latin (advērāre) and French (avérer), which emphasize the
same search for the truth.141 Legally, the term was reserved for a
formal offer to prove a line of facts, to verify what was pleaded.
Confronting “matters of writing” with “averments” suggests that the
two groups are indeed separable. There are indisputable facts that
are part of the written text and there are other alleged facts that need
to go through the process of averment. There are “solid” facts that
are included in a “matter in writing,” and there are “fluid” facts that
exist in the “slippery memory” of the witnesses. Since the rule quoted
above bans the second type of facts, the fluid facts, it seems that a
separation between the solid and the fluid is inherent to it and
defines its very essence.
The separation is not that simple. Just consider the fact that the
trustees of the first indenture were Gilbert Gerard and Thomas
Holcroft. Since these names were written in the indenture itself, they
can be seen as “solid” facts that come from a “matter in writing.” But
what about the family ties of these two trustees to Isabel the Countess
of Rutland? As we saw earlier, they were her relatives, obviously a fact
that might support her claims. But what kind of fact is that? Fluid?
Solid? On the one hand, the family ties are not part of the written
text, but on the other hand, the name Thomas Holcroft is written and
might be connected easily to the Countess’s maiden name, which is
not written. Are we facing an averment, which is going to be rejected
139. By highlighting the correlation between the words used to phrase the parol
evidence rule and gender stereotypes, I do not in any way mean to imply that such
stereotypes are representative of a true essence of either gender or should be
sustained. On the contrary, in doing so I hope to expose more of the rule’s biased
nature.
140. See OED, supra note 76 (defining “averment” as the action of proving the
truth or genuineness by argument or evidence).
141. See id.
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under the new rule, or are we in the realm of “in writing?” Or
perhaps, Holcroft’s connection is part of the written text while
Gerard’s ties are only a fluid fact?
The same questions arise regarding the “Lady Park.” The name of
that property was almost certainly written on the first indenture, but
its use as a hunting place for ladies probably was not mentioned. Is it
enough that the word “lady” was written to make its special meaning a
matter in writing, or is this contextual information too fluid and
therefore in need of averment? As these brief examples illustrate, the
division at stake is not a natural one, but is more the result of a
conscious and somewhat arbitrary effort.
The ability to separate “matters in writing” from other facts that
require averment stands at the base of a rule that suggests forbidding
such averment. Still, it is worth noticing that it also works the other
way around. A legal system that adopts such a rule is aspiring to
separation and, thus, is declaring its strong belief in the positive value
of separation.
A closer look at the tendency to separate and divide things into
disconnected groups might expose a gendered facet of the rule.142 In
general, the very attempt to draw strict borderlines and build high
walls between concepts correlates with masculine stereotypes. Such
an attempt is based upon a belief that the ability to separate one thing
from another is a human achievement and a sign of development. A
further underlying belief is that through acts of disconnection, we will
find ways to better control our lives, by organizing them into neat and
independent categories.
Fundamental ideas that shape western culture support and
reinforce the linkage between maleness and the capability of creating
a separation. One legendary instance is Sigmund Freud’s theory
concerning the stages of development of the human personality.
According to this theory, boys deal with their Oedipal complex by
separation. The boy represses his libidinal impulses toward the
mother and detaches himself from her. Freud draws a connection
between this crucial separation and the boy’s competence to develop
his super-ego. Problematically, but nevertheless with enormous
influence on our culture, he then goes on to claim that boys enjoy a
moral superiority over girls who remain entangled in their own

142. Note that this is a contemporary look. It is based on the assumption that even
if the early-modern reality has changed in a manner that makes the contractual text
accessible to women, still the rule that prefers the text can harm women due to its
masculine nature.
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Electra complex without a similar separation ability that would enable
them to resolve it.143
In contrast to this masculine image, women are not identified with
the trait of separation. Based on cultural feminism, women do not
perceive themselves, their tasks, or their experiences as isolated units.
Motherhood, as a leading example, pushes women to do just the
opposite—to combine rather than separate spheres of involvement
such as career and parenthood.144 Radical feminism is known to
respond sharply to this argument and maintains that such a
description of women is not their nature, but rather a symptom of
their inferiority.145 Male power perpetuates its control over women
by describing them as incapable of the correct and admired way of
thinking—thinking that distinguishes and separates.146 Despite this
disagreement, the scholars of feminist thought unite in their
objection to the idea that separation is attainable and valuable.147
Applying this critique to the separation under the parol evidence
rule, the attempt to distance text from context and “matters in
writing” from “averments” presents a masculine model. Dealing with
the messy information that might shed light on the contract’s
interpretation by arbitrary categorization of its pieces is not
necessarily a sign of intellectual or moral development.148 Indeed, it
143. Naturally, this last part of the theory—the equation of separation and
development—has attracted a great deal of feminist criticism. It is important to
mention that a strong argument—which supports the feminist criticism—has recently
been made from a masculine perspective. See TERRENCE REAL, I DON’T WANT TO TALK
ABOUT IT: OVERCOMING THE SECRET LEGACY OF MALE DEPRESSION (1998) (developing
the general thesis of the book that the separation and disconnection model not only
deprives women but hurts men as well and showing that the separation process does
not advance men or symbolize their development, but is rather a social dictate
imposed on men, one which exacts a heavy toll and leads to male depression).
144. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998)
(arguing that women, as opposed to men, define value in terms of intimacy,
nurturance, community, responsibility, and care); see also Jacquelyn H. Slotkin,
Should I Have Learned To Cook? Interviews with Women Lawyers Juggling Multiple
Roles, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 147, (2002) (describing—based on interviews—that
female attorneys are struggling to combine multiple commitments to their careers
and to their families and concluding that hope lies in finding more flexible and
creative ways to have it “all”).
145. See West, supra note 144, at 15 (noting that radical feminists believe that
women’s sense of connection with another person makes them vulnerable to
“invasive” and “intrusive” forms of abuse).
146. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987)
(arguing that women “think in relational terms because [their] existence is defined in
relation to men”).
147. See West, supra note 144, at 13-14 (stating that both radical feminism and
cultural feminism recognize women’s capacity for “connection to human life”).
148. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Parole Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 609-10
(1944), reprinted in FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 654 (Little, Brown & Co., 2d. ed. 1970) (suggesting that the parol
evidence rule has caused, rather than prevented, excessive litigation and has “done
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is an indication that the chosen model suffers from a lack of feminine
qualities.
B. A Hierarchical Nature
The
dichotomies
of
text/context
or
“matters
in
writing”/“averments” entail not only a dubious separation but also an
evident hierarchy. The written text is placed high above the “other”
pieces of information.149 Such positioning is made clear by the
previously quoted text in two ways: by praising the superior term, and
by condemning its lower counterpart.150
As to the praise, the text symbolizes clearly which of the
dichotomized possibilities we should trust. The most conspicuous
signifier is the association of the “matter of writing” with and not just a
simple truth, but with a “certain” truth.151 Indeed, the uplifting label
of “certain truth” is so powerful that it is almost unnecessary to look
for other signifiers. However, the characterization of writing as “made
by advice and on consideration” powerfully suggests how thoughtful
the process of writing is and hence how clever is its result.152
The element of condemnation of “averments” involves several
signifiers. The first is quite hidden and might work unconsciously.
The inferior end of the hierarchy does not even have a name. As we
saw earlier, the term “averments” covers something ambiguous that is
defined only as the negation of what was put in writing. “Averments,”
in other words, connotes something still waiting to be proved.153 The
lack of a name is meaningful when the question of dependability is at
stake. The fact-finder is likely to ask how can one trust that which has
no name? The namelessness is a representation of nonexistence and
it directly leads to the desired conclusion, i.e. that the decision-maker
should ignore these “averments.” Second, the text seems to verify our
understanding of the hierarchy by using derogating signifiers as well.
In contrast to the “certain truth” which produces the “matters of

more harm than good”).
149. See MACNAIR, supra note 47, at 136 (asserting that the parol evidence rule’s
insistence on written, as opposed to oral, modifications demonstrates a clear
preference for documentary evidence).
150. See id. (noting that the parol evidence rule is grounded in ancient theories
that viewed written evidence as “being of higher nature” than witness testimony).
151. See id. at 138 (observing that Coke, in his report on the Countless of
Rutland’s Case, excluded an agreement because the issue had been settled by the
terms of the deed).
152. See id. (noting Coke’s evidentiary preference for documents).
153. See Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90 (cautioning that the
admission of “nude averments” against written documentary evidence would have
dangerous consequences).
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writing,” the averments are “uncertain” because they result from
uncertain testimony.154
Even though this would be more than enough to clarify the order
of things to the reader, the text provides a third indication by
stressing that the uncertainty derives from “slippery memory.”155 This
is a disparaging term particularly when compared with the term
“matter in writing.”156 In Coke’s lexicon, as well as in others’ texts,
scholars frequently used “slippery memory” as an antonym of fine
legal writing and as a means for advocating writing as well as printing
and publishing.157
The fourth “hint” regarding the bottom of the hierarchy emerges
from the use of the word “nude” to describe the averments.158 In
legal archaic language, “nude” meant unattested, unconfirmed, or
unproved.159 In a narrower contractual context, it bore the worse
meaning of being void due to lack of consideration unless made by
written deed.160 In any case, to say that the averments are “nude”
clearly adds to their characterization as undependable.
Finally, the vertical view of the relationship between the written and
the unrecorded is further strengthened by the less general
expressions that precede the words that were analyzed so far. These
expressions clearly portray a ladder: “if other agreement . . . be made
by writing, or by other matter as high or higher, then the last
agreement shall stand; for every contract or agreement ought to be
dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first deed.”161 That a
hierarchical rule is of a hegemonic nature needs little elaboration.
As many feminists from different strands of feminism have claimed
before, women tend to be the systematic victims of hierarchal
154. See id. (juxtaposing documentary evidence with averments presented by
“uncertain testimony”).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See RICHARD HELGERSON, FORMS OF NATIONHOOD: THE ELIZABETHAN WRITING
OF ENGLAND 80-81 (1992) [hereinafter FORMS OF NATIONHOOD] (noting that Coke
viewed written, printed legal reports as a way of preserving the law’s certainty); see
also Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers:
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 273
(1998) (stating that Coke recommended that legal scholars commit decisions to
writing rather than trusting “slippery memory”); Dowman’s Case, 9 Co. Rep. 7b, 77
Eng. Rep. 743, 745 (reasoning that parties would never have left details to the “sliding
and slippery memory of men” because individuals’ memories fade in a short period of
time).
158. See Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90.
159. See OED, supra note 76 (defining “nude” as “not formally attested or
recorded”).
160. Id.
161. Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90. (emphasis added)
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thinking, and men in positions of power and authority usually
associate women with the lower end of each fundamental dichotomy
that constitutes western culture.162 In leading dichotomies such as
normal/strange, subject/object, main/marginal, active/passive,
culture/nature, rational/emotional, strong/weak, public/private,
autonomous/dependant, and so on, the female stereotype is echoed
by the second, less appreciated side of each pair.163 Whenever one
separates the two elements of a dichotomy, the human instinct
responds with a vertical arrangement of its parts. Furthermore,
creating such a vertical arrangement and defining the supremacy of
one of the items in each pair is often the initial motivation for
distinguishing the favorite item from its surroundings.164 Applying
this analysis to the dichotomy at hand, we can instantly observe the
phenomenon in action in Coke’s text. In the dichotomies of
certain/uncertain, truthful/deceitful, solid/fluid, written/oral and
covered/nude, as in the many other dichotomies mentioned before,
the female stereotype correlates with the less valued and less
trustworthy second item in each pair.165
C. An Alleged Rationality
What did Coke mean when he wrote that it would be
“inconvenient” to let matters in writing be controlled by averment?
To address this question, it is important to realize how frequent and
intentional the legal use of this word was.166 Coke used inconvenient
to mean inconsistent and preached for a consistent rule of law, a rule
that adheres to its internal logic.167 Ideally, such a rule would be
162. See West, supra note 144, at 13 (noting that cultural feminists recognize the
powerlessness of women in a male-dominated culture).
163. See Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, in SOURCEBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
176, 180-81 (Hilaire Barnett ed., Carendish Publishing 1997) (arguing that men have
structured legal language to include numerous dichotomies in which the stronger,
more valuable element is associated with masculinity).
164. See id. at 181 (observing that a language of dichotomies creates a language of
conflicts in which “one side has to be preferred, . . . [leading to] winners and losers”).
165. See KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 148, at 653 (quoting the Countess of
Rutland’s Case and equating written evidence with “certain truth,” and witness
testimony with “nude averments”).
166. See Allan D. Boyer, Understanding, Authority, and Will: Sir Edward Coke and
the Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 72 (1997) [hereinafter
Boyer, Understanding] (stating that the theme of avoiding inconvenience appeared
throughout the Coke Reports). Although the term was quite common no other
reporter of the time seemed to use it more than Coke who—according to the English
Reports Online at www.jutastat.com—used it forty-two times throughout his thirteen
volumes of reports.
167. See id. (describing Coke’s belief that the law “cannot suffer anything that is
inconvenient”). It is worth noting that here, again, coping with either Latin or LawFrench is needed since Coke’s phrasing was “Nihil quod est inconveniens, est
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based upon general reason, would offer a broad solution that applied
to most cases and would better serve the public interest.168 The use of
inconvenient thus represented flinching from reasonableness. It also
worked the other way around to signify that avoiding such
inconvenience would lead to a continuous possession of reason as well
as to its preservation.169 In a world which defines rationality as “the
quality of possessing a reason; the power of being able to exercise
one’s reason,” staying away from the inconvenient meant appearing to
uphold rationality.170
It is quite clear that Coke was aware of the risk to concrete justice
that is involved in such an approach. His response was that it is better
“that a private person should be punished or damnified by the rigor
of the law, than a general rule of the law should be broken to the
general trouble and prejudice of many.”171 The use of inconvenient
thus represented a fairly rigid devotion to abstract rationality at the
conscious expense of individuals’ concerns.
To say that it would be inconvenient to let messy reality influence
the interpretation of a written contract is to say that dedication to the
written is logical and rational. This raises a gender issue that
numerous feminist works address.172 In a nutshell, such a critique
denounces the logo-centricity of law and its artificial mask of
rationality. From a feminist perspective, these traits tend to silence
and frustrate many women by denying the value of other means of
expression and other sources of knowledge, which are not a product
of lingual analysis.173
Even at the lingual level, the search for the antonym of “rational” is
a telling one. Apart from the obvious “irrational,” such a search would
produce words such as illogical, unreasonable, foolish, crazy,
ridiculous, absurd, silly, unfounded, and groundless. Evidently, those
are all disapproving ways of describing what is not rational. However,
studies have suggested that irrational methods of communication are
an integral part of women’s lives, as women are more sensitive to non-

licitum.” Id.
168. See id. (explaining that Coke believed that the public interest was best served
by decisions that avoided inconvenience).
169. See id. (noting Coke’s theory that reason perfects the law).
170. See OED, supra note 76.
171. See Boyer, Understanding, supra note 166, at 72 (quoting Coke’s words from
1635 in his A LITTLE TREATISE OF BAILE AND MAINPRIZE).
172. See Finley, supra note 163, at 181 (arguing that the conflict-centered nature
of written legal language causes women and their concerns to be devalued or
excluded).
173. See id. at 182-83 (explaining that legal language eliminates all possibility of
expressing pain, rage, elation, love, fear, and other emotions).
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lingual symbols such as body language, tone of voice, or facial
expression, and indeed tend to use such symbols much more than
men.174 While one might resist the essentialist flavor of these
findings, as I do, if only because there cannot be one “women’s way of
thinking,” there is still a disturbing point that is worth making here.
To reject proof of unwritten facts as “inconvenient” and irrational is to
discard what is perceived as “feminine” knowledge together with ways
of communication that are more associated with women.175 It is
almost needless to note that this was an especially biased move in
early-modern times, when the official way of performing rational acts,
i.e. legal writing, was not even an option for women.176 Critiques of
this kind challenge the dominance of rationality in the legal discourse
and call to open legal space for extra-rational knowledge.177 It seems
to me that it is exactly the creation of such a space that the formation
of a contractual parol evidence rule prevented so effectively back in
1604.
D. A Search for Certainty
One reason why scholars consider adhering to the written text as
rational or “convenient” is because writings entail or even promote
certainty.178 According to our quoted text, the written document
174. See, e.g., JANET SHIBLEY HYDE, HALF THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY
93 (D.C. Health and Co., 4th ed. 1996) (observing that women tend to use
emotional verbs and supportive language more frequently than their male
counterparts who often use “hostile” verbs); see also Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal
Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and ”Feminine” Style, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1635, 1658-61 (1991) (noting that interactions between female lawyers and
female clients tend to be more expressive, exploratory, and contextual than in similar
meetings between men).
175. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971,
976 (1991) (supporting feminist modes of communication by claiming that
“[f]eminist narratives present experiences as a way of knowing that which should
occupy a respected, or in some cases a privileged position, in analysis and
argumentation”).
176. See Finley, supra note 163, at 176 (asserting that, throughout the history of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, men have shaped, defined, and read the law in
accordance with their world view).
177. See, e.g., Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the
Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake’s Ladder in the Context of Amy’s Web, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 243, 254-55 (1988) (describing a law professor’s successful attempts to
engage his students by telling them a parable illustrating the value of emotion and
extra-logical forms of communicating); see also Kate Green, Being Here—What a
Woman Can Say About Land Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL
SUBJECTS OF LAW 102 (Anne Bottomley ed., 1996) (reinforcing the case for
nonscientific approaches to legal decision-making by noting that “[l]aw comes from
the whole of human life, not only from a disembodied intellect”).
178. Compare BCCI decision, supra note 48, at para. 78 (emphasizing that “[t]he
meaning of the agreement is to be discovered from the words which they have used . .
. .”), with Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 838-39 (2002) [hereinafter Comfort of
OF WOMEN
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carries the “certain truth,” while the averments consist of “uncertain
Positioning “certain truth” against “uncertain
testimony.”179
testimony” not only suggests a preference for what is written, referred
to in the earlier discussion of “hierarchy,” but can be seen as a
representation of the sincere nature of certainty, as well as a barrier
against the deceitful nature of uncertainty. The question would then
be, is this really the case? Assuming that certainty is achievable, which
is doubtful, is it necessarily better? Is it in fact truthful?
From a feminist perspective, as well as from a post-modern
viewpoint, the answer seems quite negative. To assume that certainty
is so desirable means to believe that we should struggle to maintain
the status quo. But who is most interested in maintaining the status
quo if not the powerful who are best served by it and feel comfortable
with it? For the weaker members of a given society, those who yearn
for change, it is the status quo that prevents hope.180 For such
members, their inferiority is certain, and they dream of the uncertain
transformation.
Certainty, in other words, is valuable for some but not for all. It is
valuable not necessarily because of its “truthful” nature but because of
the service it provides for the “haves” at the expense of the “havenots.”181 As a representation of a concrete interest, certainty is not
the truth, but rather a partial version of truth, namely the part that
was well documented in legal written terms.182 From the standpoint
of those with no access to the written text, there is nothing attractive
about the “certainty” that others gain from adopting the text. The
tone that praises certainty is thus quite masculine. It holds no
acknowledgement of doubt or equivocation and it does not reflect
what the English poet Keats termed “Negative Capability:” the capacity
to remain in situations of uncertainty, mystery, and doubt.183
One may find support for this position by deconstructing the
juxtaposition of written texts to averments. When Coke’s text links
Certainty] (rejecting arguments that the formalism of plain meaning and an
“objectivist” parol evidence rule is a desirable or effective way to interpret words).
179. See KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 148, at 653 (quoting the relevant portions
of the Countess of Rutland’s Case) (emphasis added).
180. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 175, at 975-76 (arguing that the “neutrality” of
the law reflects the perspective of the powerful and oppresses the powerless).
181. See Finley, supra note 163, at 179 (arguing that law’s emphasis on objective
and neutral written language can “silence the voices of those who did not participate
in its creation”).
182. See id. (noting that the legal language’s preoccupation with “neutrality” fails
to include the “alternative voices,” that experience and perspective provides, which
also informs good decision-making).
183. See FRUG, supra note 17, at 117-19 (criticizing Posner and Rosenfield’s article
that praises the “certainty” of specific performance and rejects the uncertainty of
equitable approaches).
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writing with certain truth and connects averments with uncertain
testimonies (lies) as reasons for preferring the written agreement, we
could try a Derrida-like reversal.184 We could consider the possibility
that the virtue of the certain could be seen as the virtue of the
uncertain and vice-versa. This “upside-down” view exposes that the
certain is no more truthful than the uncertain.185 Indeed, if anything,
the certain is potentially more misleading. As a written artifact, the
certain is usually more tangible than any other source of information,
but it is exactly this “black and white” nature that allows for
manipulative planning through editing and revising.186 The human
control of the written distances it from the authentic happening until
it can no longer represent a truth, let alone a certain truth.187
Indeed, the very technique of law reporting in which Coke was
engaged while creating the dichotomy of certain/uncertain confirms
this post-modern view: the written report was not the truth but the
uncertain version of the truth, a late interpretation of a specific
reporter.188 As I will show later, this “late interpretation” was heavily
dependent on and reflective of the reporter’s personal views and
agenda. To sum up, it seems essential to view the quest for certainty
with suspicion—as reflecting hegemonic motives in portraying
something as universally beneficial when it actually benefits only a
few.
E. Pro-market Orientation
Coke’s much-quoted text warned that “it would be dangerous to
purchasers and farmers” to admit “nude averments.”189 The word
“purchasers” probably referred to people who acquired “land or
property in any way other than by inheritance,” while “farmers” were

184. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakrarorty
Spivak trans., 1976) (exploring the opposition of speech to writing and arguing that
modern, western culture prefers the former over the latter).
185. See J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743,
755 (1987) (describing Derrida-like reversals and their justification).
186. See Comfort of Certainty, supra note 178, at 837 (declaring that any judge
who asserts that the written word is “immutable” is “build[ing] on clay”).
187. See id. at 838 (asserting that non-written elements of a contract, such as the
identity of the parties and the nature of the agreement, are as essential as the “words
used” in correctly interpreting the context of the contract).
188. See Boyer, Understanding, supra note 166, at 86-90 (noting when Coke added
a disingenuous explanation of his controversial stance in publishing his report of the
Bunham’s Case, a case of first impression).
189. Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90. It is meaningful to realize
that Coke frequently used the same words in the commercial context. See, e.g.,
Dillon v. Freine 1 COKE REPORT 120a, 76 ER 270; Smith v. Mills 2 COKE REPORT 25a,
76 ER 441; Green v. Balser, 2 COKE REPORT 46a, 76 ER 519; Mildmay's Case, 6 COKE
REPORT 40a, 77 ER 311; Burrel's Case, 6 COKE REPORT 72a, 77 ER 364.
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most likely those who rented or leased such property.190 Since
neither purchasers nor farmers were directly involved in this Case, it
seems that the use of these words was more metaphoric, reflective of a
greater concern.191 What danger did Coke have in mind? Who or
what was he trying to defend?
The authentic answer to these questions may not be clear, but it
appears that Coke was making a policy point: things will work better if
we adhere to written words and not let other pieces of knowledge
subvert them. Exactly which things will work better is answered by the
formula of “purchasers and farmers”—and indeed, it seems that their
concerns and businesses were Coke’s focal point.192 Plainly, he was
not interested in the way noblemen or their heirs received their
property due to their status, but rather in those who used contracts or
contract principles for exchanging property. While society as a whole
was perhaps taking the first steps of what Sir Henry Sumner Maine
would much later describe as a long journey from status to
contract,193 Coke seemed interested in the contractual tool itself, the
one used by purchasers and farmers. The danger he visualized was in
all likelihood the danger of chaos—of never-ending clashes and
contradictions between written contracts and oral promises, between
legal texts and the human contexts that threaten to change their
meaning. To enable commercial activity, to let purchasers and
farmers bargain, Coke must have believed it crucial to have law and
order, law that maintains order, and law that embraces the written
and knowingly chooses to ignore the surrounding circumstances.
This last point is strongly connected to the above-mentioned value of
certainty and it suggests that the first version of the parol evidence
rule should be seen as a “pro-market” act, one that aspires to advance
the embryonic market and to facilitate its operation.194

190. See OED, supra note 76 (defining “purchaser” and “farmer”).
191. Note that the Countess of Rutland herself might be considered a potential
purchaser, but from her point of view, there was certainly no danger in admitting
averments. To the contrary, she was offering these averments herself.
192. See Boyer, Understanding, supra note 166, at 54 (noting that Coke tended to
equate “right and law with the protection of individuals’ lives, property and honor”).
193. See SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montague ed.,
University of Arizona Press 1986) (1861) (noting that “progressive societies”
exemplify this shift).
194. See MACNAIR, supra note 47, at 136-39 (observing that the earliest uses of the
parol evidence rule involved wills of real property, followed soon after by the parol
evidence rule’s application to contracts and deeds). The term “market” should be
read with caution as it is extremely doubtful that a “market” in its current sense was
even beginning to rise. What I mean by “market” simply refers to “business-like”
activity, which is executed by contracts.
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The view that this was a period of critical transformation, from a
feudal regime to a more contractual economy, has been argued and
contested at length and needs little exploration here.195 It is
important to realize that, from a gender perspective, such commercial
motives as represented by the terms “purchasers” and “farmers” are
truly and highly problematic. The placement of women outside the
admirable spheres of commerce/business/market and within inferior
realms, namely domestic spaces, is a phenomenon that a number of
scholars have explored in varied contexts.196 Yet, it is worth repeating
the point: purchasers and farmers, who contracted at the core of what
was then “the market,” might have been better off relying on the
written words which they could probably write and control. Women
at the time, however, were most likely not better off. For them, as the
Countess of Rutland’s Case neatly demonstrates, the chances of
finding the right interpretation of the contract within the four
corners of the written document were very slim.
F. Textual Adaptation of a Masculine Image
To sum up the above five points, it seems that the text itself speaks
in a gendered language, winking at the masculine stereotypes while
emphasizing a deterrence from association with feminine ones.
Whether Coke was aware of this impact is highly doubtful, but it may
also be less important. Two other points seem more imperative here.
First, the fact that this text survived through the centuries and has
been quoted repeatedly is remarkable.197 For some reason, Coke’s
195. See generally, e.g., LAWRENCE STONE, THE CRISIS OF THE ARISTOCRACY: 15581641 (1965) [hereinafter STONE, CRISIS] (describing the lives of the English “elite”
and the effects of a crisis among this class on English political institutions); KARL
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 163-77 (1964) (documenting the role of men—
but not women—in the establishment of a labor market); A.W.B. Simpson, Land
Ownership and Economic Freedom, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 13-43
(Harry N. Scheiber ed., Stanford University Press 1998) [hereinafter Simpson, Land
Ownership] (exploring the evolution of the common law of property and land
transfer); ANDREW MCRAE, GOD SPEED THE PLOUGH: THE REPRESENTATION OF AGRARIAN
ENGLAND 1500-1660, at 14 (1996) (noting that the sale of church land in the midsixteenth century gave the real property market a “modern” shape); HILL, supra note
78, at 102 (maintaining that “in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as
agriculture was being commercialized, so the Common Law was being adapted to the
needs of capitalist society and the protection of property.”). See also LUKE WILSON,
THEATERS OF INTENTION: DRAMA AND THE LAW IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 70-71 (2000)
(suggesting that emerging contractual fears occupied the dramatic imagination of the
period).
196. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of
Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1560-61 (1991) (finding that the “economic
marginalization of [female] caregivers” plays a part in many women’s decisions to
have an abortion); John Wightman, Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract
Theory, and the Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 93, 98-102 (2000).
197. See MACNAIR, supra note 47, at 138-39 (explaining the Countess of Rutland
Case by noting that the decision may be the earliest common-law authority applying
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phrasing “made sense” for generations to come. I think that the
reason has much to do with the structuring of gender in our society.
The oppositions that Coke used, as well as his way of putting things
“in order” and under control, probably correlated to and resonated
with what was encrypted in developing modern legal minds.198 Saying
that the rational approach is better than the irrational one, to use
only one example, probably felt natural and axiomatic. Preferring a
rational to the irrational was a way of reflecting how things are
without the need to claim how they should be, just as men are viewed
as more dominant than women.199
The second point concerns legitimacy and authority. For reasons
that I will discuss in Part IV, Coke’s goal appears to have been to build
a better image for the common law. If one is engaged in such a
mission, then describing the law as more masculine and less feminine
is a fruitful and powerful rhetoric, one that has the ability to establish
authority and legitimacy.200 It is, to use Stanley Fish’s words, an
“amazing trick” that is done by the law—“its ability to construct the
(verbal) ground upon which [it] then confidently walk[s].”201
Nicolette
She lost her home.
The year was 2003 and she enjoyed legal personhood with the
ability to be a party to the contract with John. And yet the contractual
texts only described how she received her home as a gift from John
and how, only a few months later, she gave it back to him.202 The
judges treated every other part of her story as irrelevant.203 But, the
decision as to what is relevant and what is not is seldom a neutral one.
the parol evidence rule to agreements and deeds).
198. See Boyer, Understanding, supra note 166, at 72 (observing that Coke
believed that all uncertain matters must be decided by reason, and that law was “the
perfection of reason”).
199. See Finley, supra note 163, at 176-77 (asserting that the “universal and
objective thinking” that defines legal reasoning is entirely patriarchal and excludes
women’s own definitions of legal concepts).
200. See infra notes 211-341 (elaborating on this idea in the fourth section by
comparing Coke’s efforts to Portia’s efforts).
201. I thank Kathryn Abrams for this way of putting the point and for referring me
to Fish’s helpful metaphor. See Kathryn Abrams, Review Essay: The Unbearable
Lightness of Being Stanley Fish: Reviewing Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as
Free Speech and It’s a Good Thing, Too, 47 STAN. L. REV. 595, 602 (1995).
202. See Clark v. Hannah-Clark, No. B157749, Cal. App. LEXIS 5058, at *3 (stating
that in December of 1998, Nicolette reconveyed the property to John by a “grant
deed” describing the transfer as a “cancellation and return of gift”).
203. See id. at *11 n.6 (disregarding Nicolette’s argument that her reconveyance
of property to John was conditioned upon his promise to transfer it to their son, and
reasoning that “the parties have not briefed the issue, and . . . we affirm on other
grounds”).
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The exclusion of the context, by means of adherence to the text
necessarily involves the creation and inclusion of a different context—
one that does not exist in reality. This new, imaginary context is
loaded with monogamist patriarchal values.
The opening sentence of the appellate decision presents Nicolette
as a nanny and declares that she worked for “John and Lynn, husband
and wife.”204 The rest of the judicial text diminishes the ongoing
relationship Nicolette had with John, acknowledging only the most
necessary facts regarding their joint son. Furthermore, the judges tell
us how she “and the boy moved into the . . . [cottage] . . . located near
John and Lynn’s home.”205 Notice the sense of invasion and
penetration created by this phrasing. Is it not obvious that as a single
mother with a newborn child (and not a “boy,” as described by the
court) she could not do such a thing without, at a minimum, John’s
invitation and Lynn’s silent consent?
Of course, the unusual arrangement of a married couple and their
children living together with the husband’s lover and their
illegitimate child, for years, could have been seen as a real challenge
to the stereotyped monogamist patriarchal model. These special
circumstances, however, were “translated” by the court into the
standard patriarchal terms. In the thrifty judicial text it was
emphasized—twice—that Lynn did not know of Nicolette and John’s
relationship, portraying her mainly as the betrayed wife.206 As part of
this naïve description we are told that during all these years Lynn
“adored” Nicolette and John’s son and treated him as her own
grandson.207 What an amazing image this extraordinary choice of
words creates: the whole unorthodox situation is normalized by a
serene depiction of an even bigger, “normal” patriarchal family,
consisting in its adapted state of three generations: grandchildren,
parents and grandparents. In this way, the image of a “warm-hearted
granny” enriches Lynn’s portrait and further strengthens the need to
protect her from her younger rival; that is, the need to protect
traditional family values.
By suggesting this reading of the judicial decision, I intend to call
attention to the manipulative potential of the textual approach,208
204. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. See id. at *2-3 (explaining that “Lynn did not know that John was the father
of the child,” and noting that Lynn was “unaware” of the original deed transferring
the cottage property to Nicolette).
207. See id. at *2 (stating that “Lynn adored the child and treated him as
grandchild”) (emphasis added).
208. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1731 (1997) (explaining that the parol
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and especially its patriarchal content. Just as a judge in Isabel’s times
knew very well that women like her could not influence the
contractual words that controlled their lives, so are judges in
Nicolette’s times fully aware of the disparity of power between a
famous and wealthy Hollywood couple and their daughter’s nanny.209
The nature of life dictates that the professionals who deal with
contracts interpretation do have the context, or at least a part thereof,
in mind. As a result, the refusal to even consider the context, the
conscious choice to ignore it, is more than an omission. De facto it
can be seen, somewhat post-modernly, as actively creating and then
taking into account a manufactured context—one that does not exist.
This context assumes, however implicitly, a reality which all knows to
be fictitious: as if Nicolette sat in front of John and, utilizing her own
rich legal and business experience, carefully negotiated, on an equal
basis, the words of her contracts.210
I imagine that it is still possible to dismiss this disturbing
contemporary example, perhaps by seeing the gendered results of
rigid textuality as a mere coincidence. It is this last argument that
pushes me to revisit early-modern England and to revert from
Nicolette to Isabel, in search of an even deeper level of analysis. What
follows, then, is a closer examination of the ideas, theories, impulses,
and intuitions that informed the establishment of the parol evidence
rule by Coke’s report of the Case.
IV. COKE’S REPORT
To hold Sir Edward Coke responsible for the establishment of the
contractual parol evidence rule requires some justification. After all,
he was only the reporter of the Case and as such might be regarded as
merely repeating what the King’s Bench judges, led by Judge Popham,
had said.211 Yet several reasons suggest that such a narrow view of
Coke’s report of this Case is inadequate.
In the first place, Coke was not just another reporter, he was the
reporter, and the only reporter who did not need to attach his name
to his volumes of reports. Considered to be the prototype, they were
evidence rule is used in a manipulative way because it “is used mainly as a rhetorical
device, aimed at disguising the active role courts play in contract interpretation”).
209. See Clark II, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 5058, at *2 (describing Nicolette as the
woman who worked for John and Lynn as a nanny for their young daughter).
210. See id. at *11 (concluding, somewhat mechanically, that “Nicolette is bound
by the December 1998 deed and is not entitled to rescind it for an alleged failure of
consideration”).
211. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 300 (stating that Coke was
privy to secret deliberations among the judges, since Chief Justice Popham would
disclose to Coke what the judges had considered in private).
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simply called “The Reports.”212 Coke served as a Member of
Parliament, Solicitor General, Attorney General, Chief Justice of
Common Pleas, and Chief Justice of the King’s Bench.213 Add to this
his comprehensive writings about the rules of England, the four
volumes of the Institutes of the Laws of England, and it becomes
evident how he came to be known as the supreme oracle of English
law,214 “what Shakespeare has been to those who write in English.”215
In other words, no other English jurist of his time had the authority
needed to establish new rules of law.
Secondly, we are fortunate enough to have another report of the
same legal episode made by a different reporter of the period, Sir
George Croke.216 According to Croke’s report, the ruling of the Case
was based on the more traditional idea of estoppel and not on the
novel idea of the parol evidence rule.217 Contrasting these two
reports suggests that it is Coke, more than the Judges of the King’s
Bench, with whom we should credit with the construction of the parol
evidence rule. Indeed, based on a similar method of comparison—
i.e., to an alternative report regarding the same case—it was argued
that the rule which was established in the prominent Shelly’s Case
“owes its authority to Coke, not to the decision.”218
Thirdly, many consider Coke to have been the kind of reporter who
would liberally insert his own comments in his reports while “not
distinguishing . . . his own views from those he was reporting.”219 And
finally, and even more generally, Coke was a zealous representative of
a generation of reporters who believed that the historical accuracy of
the report and its faithfulness to the original were less important than
212. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 183 (observing that Coke’s
volumes have been “perhaps the single most influential series of named reports”).
213. See BOWEN, supra note 93, at ix-x (giving a brief overview of Coke’s career).
214. FORMS OF NATIONHOOD, supra note 157, at 85; see BOYER: SIR EDWARD COKE,
supra note 92, at ix (opining that Coke “remains a subject for heroic treatment”).
215. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at ix (the opening sentence of Coke’s
biography)
216. See Countess of Rutland, 79 Eng. Rep. at 23.
If there be an indenture for the levying a fine to such persons, before such a
time, to such uses, and the fine be levied to the same persons within the same
time, it shall be to the same uses; and no averment can be to the contrary,
unless it be by other matter in writing.
Id.
217. See MACNAIR, supra note 47, at 139 (discussing the differences between Coke
and Croke’s reports and noting that while Coke used the case to establish the parol
evidence rule, Croke explained the ruling in terms of estoppel).
218. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 117.
219. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 183; see also Damian Powell,
Coke in Context: Early Modern Legal Observation and Sir Edward Coke’s Reports, 21
J. LEGAL HIST. 33, 47 (2000) [hereinafter Damian Powell] (commenting that Coke
included his opinions to protect his “reputation for posterity”).
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the publication of the “correct” legal doctrine for the purposes of
future use.220 As part of this “liberal” concept of reporting, it was
argued that while “reporting” Coke made an effort to place a
“substantive gloss” on the Common Law.221 One of his techniques
was to emphasize a general principle that did not actually serve as the
basis for the judgment in the particular nuanced case but was—at
best—part of its obiter dicta.222 This understanding of Coke’s general
methodology appears to fit our Case nicely, since, as mentioned, the
general rule he reported does not lead to the concrete result of the
Case.
In light of the four aspects briefly explored above, it is probable
that it was Sir Edward Coke who developed the parol evidence rule
out of the judicial decision in the Countess of Rutland case. Put
succinctly, Coke had both the opportunity and the motive to create
such a rule at that time. I will start by exploring Coke’s possible
motivations for using his reporting capacity to elevate the written
contractual text. As we shall see, the concept of the parol evidence
rule ties in with Coke’s more general ideas and ideologies in a way
that can shed light on both the rule’s nature and the reasons for its
formation.
A. Elevating the Common Law
“[T]he common law is the best and most common birth-right that
the subject hath for the safeguard and defence, not onely of his
goods, lands and revenues, but of his wife and children, his body,
fame and life also.”223
These famous words written so long ago by Sir Edward Coke
capture what appears to have been the prevailing idea that drove his
legal work: his boundless belief in the supremacy of the Common Law
220. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 183 (indicating that Coke had
no dishonest intent in adding his own commentary to the court’s words but, rather,
that he viewed his reports as a form of instruction on the law); see also Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward
Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 L. & HIST. REV. 439, 455 (2003) (noting that
opinions reported by Coke were bound to be influential since most other opinions of
that time went unreported); Damian Powell, supra note 219, at 41 (chronicling
Coke’s view of his own authority as a reporter, which led him to include “juridical
digressions” in his reports).
221. See Hulsebosch, supra note 220, at 469 (attributing Coke’s influence on the
development of the common law to his subtle inclusion of abstract principles, distinct
from the facts at hand in a given case, that could be applied to future cases).
222. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, The Genesis of Coke’s Reports, 27 CORNELL L.
Q. 190, 212 (1941-42) (positing that “it might be possible to deduce [from this
practice] that Coke was thinking (unconsciously perhaps) of the law in terms of
substance rather than of procedure . . . .”).
223. SIR EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 (J. H. Thomas
ed., 1818).
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over any alternative legal system and his ongoing struggle to
strengthen this superiority and to reinforce the dominance of the
Common Law. Coke’s general commitment to the task of elevating
the Common Law is much too expansive and profound to be
addressed here in detail; however, what appears crucial to the link
between Coke’s work and the parol evidence rule is the
multidimensional way in which his obsession with the Common Law
led him to the battle between the oral and the written, a battle of
immense importance to our understanding of the creation of the
rule.
1. The Common Law vs. the Roman Law
In 1571, when Coke left Cambridge to become a student of the law,
Roman civil law had been adopted by Germany, France, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Holland, and—most meaningfully—by Scotland.224 This
development, also known as the “reception,” generated considerable
legal anxiety in sixteenth century England.225 England had not been
part of the reception process, and the common view, until then, had
been that the English law should stay insular and different.226
Nonetheless, we can imagine that retaining a system so manifestly
different from that of the neighboring world might become a
tremendously trying experience and the source of a great sense of
inferiority. Indeed, “on the Continent, the English law was looked on
as brutal,”227 and then a critique from within, made in the 1530s by
Thomas Starkey, further condemned the English legal practice as
medieval and barbarous.228
The attacks were obviously a source of significant apprehension and
produced a defensive response accompanied by a desire for
assimilation. Calls for legal reform and calls to join Europe by
adopting some version of the Roman civil law, were starting to be
heard. The idea that England needed a written law was growing out of
the combination between two different schools of thought:
Renaissance Humanism and English Nationalism.229
In 1535,
Richard Morrison presented a “discourse touching the Reformations
of the Laws of England” to King Henry III, which suggested actually
writing the law.230 Morrison was paraphrased as saying:
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See FORMS OF NATIONHOOD, supra note 157, at 67.
Id.
Id.
See BOWEN, supra note 93, at 64.
See FORMS OF NATIONHOOD, supra note 157, at 65.
Id. at 101.
See id. at 70 (proposing to gather the unwritten laws of the land and write
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What the Romans did the English can and should do. They should
write the law, produce an English equivalent of the Corpus Juris
Civilis. Not only would such a book remedy the law’s confusion and
uncertainty, it would stand as a mark of civility, a mark of England’s
freedom from barbarism.231

This call remained unanswered for several decades.232 The mission
was too challenging and intimidating. If possible at all, it required a
rare jurist who is shrewd, learned, ambitious, highly respected,
experienced, self-confident and meticulous. It was Coke who had all
these qualities (in large quantities) and who took upon himself the
lifelong mission of writing down the laws of England.233 Other than
Coke “no one had attempted a picture so comprehensive, [a] legal
exposition on so grand a scale.”234 His eleven volumes of the reports
came first, followed by his four volumes of the Institutes and it was
said that “together they should . . . represent the whole law of
England, spread upon paper for students to learn and see.”235
For years Coke wrote with “a persistent awareness of a rival system
of law against which English law had to defend and define itself.”236
Moreover, by writing laws down he attempted to create a new image
for them. No longer would the law be the common memory of small
professional communities, instead, the law would be something else.
The law would be more stable, more systematic, more approachable,
and, above all, more civilized. In other words, English law would
become something that could compete with Roman law.
It is worth stressing for our purposes that putting the law in writing
was a way of fighting for the Common Law’s authority.237 In contrast
to the Roman code, here the written result was not the authentic law,
but a strategic representation of the law. The law itself remained oral,
chiefly what the judges had said, for years in courts. Indeed, Coke
himself pointed to the risk inherent in English law’s oral nature and
explained the importance of writing by warning against the
phenomenon of “slippery memory.”238 Interestingly, he used this
them down).
231. Id.
232. See id. at 70-71 (explaining that although they identified the need for a
writing, no one accepted the task until Coke’s generation).
233. See id. at 80 (noting that many lawyers of the time would have kept their own
reports of court proceedings in manuscript form, but that none of these lawyers
undertook to create the extensive and illustrative body of work that Coke created).
234. See BOWEN, supra note 93, at 508.
235. Id.
236. See FORMS OF NATIONHOOD, supra note 157, at 71.
237. See id. at 80 (noting that Coke’s reports provided a defense of the English
legal system against those threats embodied in Roman law).
238. See id. at 81 (suggesting that the reasoning and rules of judges tend to get lost
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same phrase again and again, whenever he wanted to justify writing,
including in the Countess of Rutland’s Case where he established the
parol evidence rule.239 The danger of “slippery memory” was the
danger of the “slippery slope,” i.e. the danger of losing authority.
Thus, by mimicking the Roman law technique of writing, Coke tied
the Common Law to one of the most admired characteristics of its
rival, and could thus present the Common Law as the “most equal,
most certain, of greatest antiquity and least delay, and most beneficial
and easy to be observed.”240
2. The Common Law vs. the Oaths
The Common Law was threatened by its “barbarous” image not
only because of the widespread reception of Roman law, but also
because of flaws in its own procedures. Chief among these was wager
of law—an archaic procedure, originally used in local courts all over
England and a very popular defense method in cases of unpaid
debt.241 When sued for not paying their debt, the defendants could
ask to “wage,” that is make their law by taking an oath that they do not
owe the money or the goods in question.242 The defendant would
then bring eleven neighbors or friends, compurgators, to strengthen
the initial oath by taking a secondary oath that the defendant is
trustworthy and their oath was good.243 As time passed, this
procedure expanded from the local courts to the central courts in
Westminster, where it became increasingly unfeasible to bring close
neighbors or friends to support the defendant’s claims.244 A fictional
practice of using “professionals,” hired oath-helpers, also known as
“knights of the post,” was developed to cope with this problem.245
At the end of the sixteenth century and at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, pamphlets mocked the oath-helpers who “will
sweare you anything for twelue pence,” and the period’s literature was
full of references to the corruption of the knights of the post.246
in the transmission of oral accounts). Therefore, his reports provide a remedy to
preserve the record of the court. Id.
239. Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90.
240. 2 CO. REP. (opening sentences of the preface).
241. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 318 (“Oral agreements were
best left to the local courts, where proof by compurgation was used.”).
242. Id. at 74, 319.
243. Id. at 74.
244. Id. (reporting that this practical obstacle led the oath-taking procedure to
become fictionalized, contributing to its demise).
245. Lorna Hutson, Not the King’s Two Bodies: Reading the ”Body Politic” in
Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2, in RHETORIC AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 166, 184-85 (Victoria Kahn & Lorna Hutson eds., 2001)
246. Id. (quoting THE WORKS OF THOMAS NASHE vol. 1, 164 (R.M. McKerrow ed.
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Dependence upon this old procedure entailed such risk to one’s
reputation that even its classic beneficiaries, the defendants,
increasingly were deterred from relying on it.247 Not surprisingly, the
practice of waging law came at the price of increasing disrespect for,
and diminishing faith in, the legal system that used it and relied on it
to do justice. As Lorna Hutson notes, “In literary texts, the openness
of wager of law to abuse became symbolic of wider corruption in
judicial and political systems . . . .”248
The use of oaths at the turn of the sixteenth century was, therefore,
something that needed to be abolished, and it was, like writing the
law, a mission for Coke to fulfill.249 He did this by challenging the
system of oaths as part of his argument in the famous Slade’s Case.
The decision in this case practically eradicated the wager of law.250 A
keystone of the modern law of contract, Slade’s Case, which was
litigated during the years of 1597-1602,251 is known for its legal
recognition of “implied promises” arising from a contract.252
However, as David Sacks pointed out, legal historians tend to agree
that the decision in Slade was at its time mainly “a vehicle for
accomplishing what the lawyers and judges were really after—namely,
the displacement of the older forms of action in contract with new
ones capable of attracting potential plaintiffs to the common-law
courts.”253

1966)).
247. See David Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context,
4 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 295, 313 (1984) (explaining that to wage law would
amount to an admission of liability and that even innocent men would rather pay
then use this defense).
248. See Hutson, supra note 245, at 187 (noting that William Shakespeare was
among the most influential Elizabethan authors who dealt with the problem of
oaths); see also BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 133 (observing that Coke
viewed written records as more reliable than oaths by self-interested parties).
249. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 113 (observing that,
meaningfully, it was Judge Popham—Coke’s mentor, the head of the King’s Bench
and, the same judge who was reported by Coke as forming the parol evidence rule in
our Case—who entrusted the Case to Coke’s experienced hands).
250. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 345.
251. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 125 (stating the years of the
litigation in Slade’s Case ). These dates, as well as the contractual context and the
identity of its reporter, make Slade’s case entirely relevant to the discussion regarding
our 1604 Case.
252. See id. at 129 (stating that the recognition of implied promises was necessary
in order to facilitate the use of the new action of assumpsit in a larger variety of
contractual situations, including cases in which the plaintiff could have used the old
form of action of debt).
253. See David Harris Sacks, The Promise and the Contract in Early Modern
England: Slade’s Case in Perspective, in RHETORIC AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE
28, 37 (Victoria Kahn & Lorna Hutson eds., 2001) (emphasis added).
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We will go back to these marketing efforts later, but for now it is
important to see more generally the pains that Coke took to extricate
the Common Law from the corrupted and barbarous stigma caused
by oaths, and to portray the Common Law as a more rational and
better controlled legal system. In this regard, Coke had to address the
claim that it was inappropriate to allow plaintiffs to opt for a
procedure that would deny the defendants’ “right” to wage their law.
It was argued that this was especially inequitable in situations where
defendants had fulfilled their share in the transaction privately and,
hence, could not otherwise prove their innocence.254
To this Coke replied that the reliance upon oaths “induces men . . .
to perjury.”255 At the practical level, his argument, albeit cynical, was
at once rational, practical, and highly educational: the debtor should
obtain a receipt.256 Here, we see Coke dealing pragmatically with the
tension between the oral, the private payment, and the written, the
receipt, and preferring the tangible record over the elusive oaths. At
the policy level, his argument embraced the King’s Bench modern
view that considered the wager of law an “anachronistic and irrational
mode of trial,”257 and hence, offered a trial by jury.
Whether the trial by jury of the early-modern times was indeed
better is highly doubtful,258 but, nevertheless, what is important to
our discussion is that jury trials had the appearance of being more
rational and, therefore, were considered an improvement. At any
rate, the combination of both the practical policy levels of Coke’s
response led to the conclusion that the best, if not the only, way to
refrain from being charged for breaching one’s contract is to present
tangible proof to the jury.
Focusing on the cancellation of wager of law we can see that Slade’s
Case involves a series of dichotomies: oaths/jury, mystical/rational,

254. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 130 (indicating that the
defendant could wage his law only in the old-fashioned action upon debt and not in
the newer, emerging action of assumpsit).
255. Slade’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1078 (K.B. 1602).
256. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 130 n.60 (adding that “Coke’s
estate records . . . show that this was his own careful practice”).
257. See Ibbetson, supra note 247, at 312.
258. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 139 (1975)
[hereinafter SIMPSON, HISTORY] (“A fifteenth-century jury was an oath-taking body
which closely resembled a set of eleven compurgators, the main difference being the
fact that its composition was not determined by the defendant.”); see also BOYER, SIR
EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 133 (recording that the dissatisfaction from a trial by
jury as a substitute for wager of law was so deep that it finally led to the legislation of
the Statue of Frauds in 1677); BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 348-50
(observing that this legislation, which survived as the “Sale of Goods Act” until 1954,
insisted on the requirement of writing and made certain classes of oral contract
completely unenforceable).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/1

58

Keren: Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of the Parol Ev

2005]

THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE WITH GENDER IN MIND

309

medieval/Common Law, ancient/modern, corrupt/fair and
suspect/trustworthy. Paralleling these dichotomies we can perceive
this case as representing a move259 away from the first element, and
towards the second element of each dichotomy. Coke’s practical
suggestion—that the debtor should keep documents that could prove
payment—raises another dichotomy, which correlates with the above
move, that of the oral versus the written. The “written” symbolizes
tangibly the superior term in each of the above dichotomies: the
rational, modern, fair, and trustworthy Common Law, a law which was
wise enough to get rid of the oaths in 1602.260 One result of the
Slade’s Case move was that many more oral contracts could then be
litigated under the Common Law through the action of assumpsit.261
This probably raised a series of questions about the status of the oral
newcomers in relation to the familiar written contracts.
Was Coke, already occupied by the clash between the written and
the oral in the greater context of the competition with the written
civil law, aware that this complication was to follow from his victory in
Slade’s? It is difficult to know the answer. However, if he did have
this potential conflict in mind, this might explain why he made such
an effort to establish the parol evidence rule through our Case, even
though it was not required given its concrete facts.
3. The Common Law Versus the Common People
To date, what is considered as Coke’s leading contribution to the
modernization of the medieval version of the Common Law is the
concept of “artificial reason.”262 The idea is two-fold: first, that the
Common Law is a product of reason and hence reasonable; and,
second, that this reason is not natural, but something else, artificial
and perfect. In Coke’s famous words: “Reason is the life of the law,
nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason; which is to be
understood as an artificial perfection of reason . . . .”263

259. See Sacks, supra note 253, at 37 (viewing Slade’s Case as a “move” as opposed
to “mentalité”). As Sacks argues, “[m]oves are highly sensitive to the particularities of
the historical setting in which they are made.” Id.
260. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 132 (reporting that in 1602,
“[o]ath-helping passed into desuetude, and lawyers forgot the procedures for waging
law”).
261. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 347 (indicating that Slade’s Case
signaled the “formal unification of the law of parol contracts through the action of
assumpsit”) (emphasis in original).
262. See Shaunnagh Dorsett, ‘Since Time Immemorial’: A Story of Common Law
Jurisdiction, Native Title and the Case of Tanistry, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 32, 37 (2002)
(defining “artificial reason” as “the prerogative of the learned judiciary”).
263. COKE, supra note 223, at 1.
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The first layer of Coke’s concept placed “reason” at the core of law.
Such a view afforded the Common Law a much needed unifying
method, one that could tie together the dispersed precedents that
had been building up for so many years.264 Coke’s definition of the
law as based upon reason provided the judges with a common tool of
assessment: “[w]hat they found reasonable, the judges approved;
whatever failed to meet the test of reason, they struck down.”265 This
brilliant idea made the law appear fundamentally coherent.
Suddenly, the Common Law seemed to have “common sense,” and
with Coke’s brush it was painted as rational, consistent and logical.
Simultaneously, this magical concept increased the judges’ credibility
and reliability, for they were the users of the efficient tool of reason
and, as a result, they became the source of reason, its carrier and its
reflection. Combined together, these two improvements—of both the
image of the law and that of its judges—contributed immensely to the
strengthening of the Common Law’s authority.
It is important to notice that even Coke’s choice of the term
“reason” is extremely significant. As indicated earlier, we know he was
acutely aware of the increasing appeal of the sophisticated, elegant,
and classical Roman law.
We may assume that since Coke was incredibly knowledgeable and
well read,266 he knew the Roman maxim that one should follow
reasons rather than precedents.267 This maxim plainly assumes a
contradiction between “reason” and “precedent.”
Against this
background, Coke—in an act of alchemy—turned precedent into
reason. He took the term “reason” and made it interchangeable with
precedent; the judicial point of view was reason and following
precedents were, therefore, reasonable. Looking closely at the choice
of the word “reason,” for instance, in the above quote whereby “the
common law itself is nothing else but reason,”268 we can see the
labored effort that Coke made in presenting the Common Law as
though it resembled the respected Roman law without changing its
true nature. In my view, it was mainly a change of image rather than a
substantive transition.

264. See John Underwood Lewis, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1633): His Theory of
“Artificial Reason” as a Context for Modern Basic Legal Theory, 84 L. Q. REV. 330, 336
(1968) (arguing that Coke’s “perfect reason” became the foundation to establish a
more coherent common law).
265. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 921at 106.
266. See BOWEN, supra note 93, at 8 (noting that Coke had a reputation as a
scholar and was known to research the law and origins of government).
267. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 196-97.
268. See COKE, supra note 223, at 1.
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The second layer of Coke’s idea, the “artificial” part, served as a way
to distinguish legal reason, reasoning and reasonableness from the
more “natural” traits of reason. To Coke, artificial reason was
anything but the ordinary understanding of the human brain. It was
artificial in the sense of “man-made,” something that emerges from an
extremely professional process and, to use Coke’s original words, “not
of every man’s natural reason.”269 Artificial reason was substantially
different from the normal way of thinking, involving legalized
reasoning and requiring “long study, observation and experience.”270
To view law as defined by artificial reason, and artificial reason as
reserved for legal specialists was a patronizing move. As Hulsebosch
put it, Coke “championed the ‘artificial reason’ of the legal
community above the natural reason of the individual.”271 No doubt,
such a vision powerfully symbolized and, at the same time, reinforced
the superiority of the Common Law and its experts. Yet such a vision
also evidently distanced and rejected the common people, those who
often needed the legal services.272
In a way that is meaningful to the connection between the status of
the Common Law and that of writing, part of this distancing project
was attained by the use of written lingual tools. The reasoned law, as
written by Coke and others, appeared to be in an especially reserved
language, one that no “ordinary” person could fully understand.273
This strange, if not secret, language even had a symbolic name: “LawFrench,” a name that captures neatly the condescending character of
the exclusive legal club.274 Other than exposing the true demeaning
spirit of “artificial reason,” it is worth seeing how such a name also
constitutes a nod to Europe. However, just like writing an English
version of Institutions and just like talking of “reason” instead of using

269. Id.
270. Id. See also Charles Gray, Reason, Authority, and Imagination: The
Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke, in CULTURE AND POLITICS FROM PURITANISM TO THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 25, 61 (Perez Zagorin ed., 1980) (describing such professionalism as
“art”).
271. See Hulsebosch, supra note 220, at 460 (emphasis added).
272. See id. (observing that because mastery of the law required years of intensive
study, it was inaccessible to even the “wisest” of lay people).
273. See Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance
Debate Over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 373 (1998)
[hereinafter Ross, Commoning] (describing the philosophical and cultural
underpinnings of the debate over whether to print the Common Law and thereby
make it more accessible to the lay people). “‘Which of us has not heard it objected,’
asked Thomas Wentworth in The Office and Duty of Executors (1641), ‘that we the
professors of the law, seek to hide and secret the knowledge thereof under this dark
and distasted’ French language?” Id. at 371.
274. See id. at 374 (reporting that this language was one of the anti-publicists’
means of keeping the developing law out of the reaches of laypeople).
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the term “precedents,” this, too, was only a cosmetic maneuver: the
words were seldom in “real” French and the content was totally
English-made.275
As we shall now see, the two layers of “reason” and of “artificial” are
important to the creation of the parol evidence rule. This is
illustrated by a telling example that preceded our Case, the wellknown Shelly’s Case,276 in which Coke’s argument won him
enormous admiration.277 The dispute concerned the interpretation
of a contractual formula that was commonly used in family
settlements, in which owners of land tried to control the future of
their estates.278 Edward Shelly used the following formula: to A
(himself) for life, then to the heirs of A in order to pass on his estate
(or the major part thereof) to his grandson from his deceased first
son.279 The problem, however, was that this grandson was not yet
born when Edward used the formula and, therefore, at that specific
point in time, Edward’s male heir was still Richard Shelly, Edward’s
brother.280 Richard claimed that the above formula gave him an
immediate interest in Edward’s estates, one which later incidents,
such as the appearance of a newborn grandson could not rescind.281
The grandson’s counterclaim was that the transfer only happened
after Edward’s death, a time in which he, and not his uncle Richard,
was the closest male heir.282
Shelly’s Case emphasizes the strong connection between the idea of
artificial reason as a locus of legal expertise, on the one hand, and the
interpretation of legal, and specifically contractual, language on the
other.283 Richard’s elite lawyers creatively emphasized the need to

275. See id. at 436-37 (recounting several criticisms of Coke’s Reports).
276. See 91 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1581).
277. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 133, at 286 (indicating that Coke’s
ability to persuade the King’s Bench to adopt his argument in this case led the courts
to recognize that legal rules should govern executory interests); see also A.W. BRIAN
SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 13-44 (1995) [hereinafter SIMPSON,
LEADING CASES] (supplying a detailed historical background and legal analysis of the
case).
278. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 114-20 (describing the dispute
and how it subverted traditional rules of inheritance).
279. Id. at 115.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND & FAMILY 138 (1993) (examining facts
analogous to those in Shelly’s Case from a feminist point of view by noting that “[t]o
B’s son if he should have a son, but to his younger brother if he should not, is a
limitation that cuts out in advance B’s female heirs”) (emphasis added).
283. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 119-20 (noting that Shelly’s
Case launched an era, lasting four centuries, which largely ignored parties’ intentions
and interpreted legal documents in a technical and esoteric fashion).
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respect Edward’s intention at the time of writing, which they took as
Edward’s desire to transfer immediate entitlement to his brother.284
Opposing them stood Coke, who represented Edward’s grandson and
argued for a “reasonable” interpretation of the legal formula.285 To
him, “reasonable” meant the way legal experts of the time would write
and read the formula that Edward used.286 Coke based his argument
on a literal approach to lawyers’ language, a language that became the
visible symbol of their expertise.287 At a very practical level, this kind
of “artificial reasoning” ruled out the thesis of immediate inheritance
by Richard and brought Coke’s client, Edward’s grandson, the
victory.288
However, what is even more important for the current discussion is
that the same reasoning rejected the relevance of other
understandings of identical language and left out the social, political
or personal meaning of the legal words. Coke’s innovation was at this
later level: although his argumentation followed the old feudal rules
and caused the court to reaffirm them—his approach carried with it
radical change.289 As Allen Boyer has written:
This was one of the most significant achievements of Coke’s era,
and one of its most troubling. For the next four centuries,
whenever the terms of a legal document required definition,
English courts would apply the private, technical meaning current
among the bar. When construing contracts, courts arrogated to
themselves the construction of disputed terms, refusing to hear
what the parties themselves had meant . . . . Not until the 1950’s,
prodded by Lord Denning, would the English bench once again
begin to read documents in terms of the parties’ original intent.290

From here, the stretch to the first version of a contractual parol
evidence rule seems quite easy: if legal documents speak (reasonably)

284. See SIMPSON, LEADING CASES, supra note 277, at 31 (explaining that Richard’s
lawyers necessarily distorted the dispute in order to place the focus on Edward
Shelley’s intentions).
285. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 116-17 (explaining that Coke,
in an effort to counter the clever arguments of opposing counsel, used numerous
persuasive arguments based on the existing legal rules on remainders).
286. See SIMPSON, LEADING CASES, supra note 277, at 31-32 (reporting that the
language that Edward used in his will, “of the heirs male of the body of Edward
Shelley lawfully begotten,” were the crux of Coke’s arguments in support of Henry
Shelley’s position).
287. See id. (observing that, based on the language in the transaction, “Henry
seemed to have a good case”).
288. See id. at 34 (stating that the court found that “Richard lost his rights the
moment [Coke’s client] was born”).
289. See id. at 40 (pointing out that Coke’s arguments resulted in an inflexible
rule of law to guide document interpretation, “however silly the result”).
290. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 120.
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in a professional language, which is so different from the natural
language, then what justification can there be to accept evidence
regarding the parties’ intentions?
The general idea of artificial reason as well as its lingual derivative
fit neatly with Coke’s personal nature. Coke described himself as
direct in his speech and a strong believer in bright line rules, and
scholars attest that Coke preferred the most literal interpretation
possible to any legal written material, be it a statute, a will, or a
contract.291 His “plain-meaning” approach to questions of legal
interpretation was closely intertwined with his ways of thinking and
talking, which in turn did not lack their fair share of arrogance.292
In light of our focus on the Countess of Rutland’s Case, it is
startling to see how in his report on Shelly’s Case Coke seems to have
told his readers much more than what he said in court and certainly
more than the decision-makers stated in the actual judgment. In fact,
Serjeant Anderson, a sub-serjeant court reporter later blamed Coke
for reporting things “which had never been uttered in the
courtroom.”293 Remarkably, the famous rule that was attributed to
Shelly’s Case and prevailed for centuries, concerning the distinctive
legal meaning of the contractual formula, did not appear in any other
account of the same case.294
B. Marketing a New Image
1. Coke’s Efforts
As we have just seen, at the same period in which the Countess of
Rutland was fighting for her land and Coke was writing his “take” on
the judicial decision on the matter, the Common Law was also waging
its own battle. In this multi-frontier battle,295 Coke acted as if he was

291. See id. at 120-21 (noting that Coke saw himself as a “bluff, honest speaker”
and behaved this way when he made his courtroom remarks).
292. See id. at 201-02 (remarking that Coke thought so highly of his opinions that
he would use the sheer weight of his rhetoric in court to defeat his opponents).
293. Id. at 117.
294. See id. (noting that the Rule— “that a grant to A for life, then to the heirs of
A, gives A an immediate freehold”—does not appear in other reports of the courts
holding) (emphasis in original).
295. Other than the three battles discussed above (against the Roman law, the
oaths and the ordinary people) there were two serious additional battles taking place:
the struggle against the King and his absolutism and the competition with Equity
(and with Sir Francis Bacon). These two reached their peak slightly after the Case of
the Countess of Rutland was decided and hence are not discussed here. However,
these last two conflicts seem to fit in well with the general argument made here that
the birth of the parol evidence rule should be seen as part of the larger struggle for
the Common Law’s status and authority.
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the “Secretary of Defense” for the Common Law, planning and
executing the strategies.296
This lifelong role that Coke took upon himself involved dealing
continuously with the status of written words and their relationship to
the authority of the Common Law. As demonstrated, defending the
status of the Common Law against the Roman law, the oaths or the
ordinary people, involved considerable debate regarding the
oral/written dichotomy.297 It appears that no easy solution was
available to Coke, just as there might not be one for legal scholars
today. The Common Law was by its nature oral, but it needed to be in
written form in order to preserve and promote its authority. The
following paragraph captures this dilemma well:
The need of common lawyers to justify not only the content but the
dignity of their law against the slurs of royalists, civilians, university
scholars, country gentry, merchants, and divines, meant that lex
scripta and lex non scripta, writing and oral/memorial tradition,
opposed each other as ideal-typical constructs in debate as they
worked together in practice. Unorganized, unfindable, uncertain,
unsteady, primitive: These charges battered the unwritten common
law.298

It is also possible to analyze what was taking place at the turn of the
seventeenth century, including in our case, with postmodern tools.
Instead of a pure dichotomy between the oral and the written, one
which entails hierarchy and superiority of the oral, the two terms
related to each other more interactively. The written was becoming
more of a “dangerous supplement,” the “thing” that the oral was so
dependent upon for the sake of preserving its own existence.299 So,
to continue with the postmodern mind-set, around 1604 the hierarchy
could be seen in a reverse way: if the oral needed the written so badly
then was it not in fact the written which set the tone?300 At any rate,
the very activity of writing what originally was of oral nature had an
artificial quality, the exact effort with which Coke seemed to be
296. See Bowen, supra note 93, at 71-72 (remarking that Coke’s writings discussed
nearly six hundred cases and served as the foundations of legal reasoning for 300
years).
297. See Ross, Commoning, supra note 273, at 352 (explaining that, by the end of
the sixteenth century, skepticism about law printing sparked a fierce debate in legal
circles over its benefits and drawbacks).
298. Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers:
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 229,
319 (1998).
299. See Ross, Commoning, supra note 273, at 366 (observing that “printed
critiques survive where most manuscripts, sermons, and tavern cursing do not”).
300. But see Balkin, supra note 185, at 755 (noting that deconstructionist
philosopher Jacques Derrida has observed a “consistent valuing of speech over
writing” as a way to communicate in the western world).
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occupied when he was writing the law as well as when he was creating
rules of law that dictated the supremacy of writing.301
Scholars describe Coke as having engaged in “creating the secular
myth of the common law . . . .”302 In addition, one can see his tactic
as a campaign for improvement of image, one that aimed to create a
better appearance for an aging product, an act of marketing. In this
respect, at least one authority has already argued that Slade’s Case—
which brought litigation to the King’s Bench—was part of a marketdriven process.303 This process, the argument goes, came out of a
growing concern on the part of Common Lawyers and judges, who
felt that they were being pushed away in the competition between the
available courts of the period.304 My argument is broader and slightly
more abstract. First, I believe the struggle for the elevation of the
Common Law involved more than purely the narrow worries about
personal profits, even though such concerns—especially in an era of
rapid inflation—would certainly create a strong incentive. And
second, by “marketing campaign” I mean something more expansive
than simply offering “attractive deals,” as Slade’s Case with its new
option of assumpsit might be seen.305 I suggest a multifaceted change
of image that had the potential for long-term results, far beyond
relieving the immediate economic anxieties of the lawyers and judges
involved.306
What the Common Law needed under the marketing model, where
the product was a legal system and services, was more credibility,
trustworthiness, firmness, certainty, self-control, and steadiness. What
the Common Law required was to get rid of heavy loads of
capriciousness, haziness, instability, irrationality, unpredictability,

301. See SIMPSON, LEADING CASES, supra note 277, at 35 (noting that written
judicial decisions can reveal “pseudo-logical” arguments and can demonstrate the
“fragile foundations of legal reasoning”).
302. Peter Goodrich and Yifat Hachamovitch, Time out of Mind: An Introduction
to the Semiotics of Common Law, in DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS: RESISTANCE AND
RENEWAL IN JURISPRUDENCE 159, 171 (Peter Fitzpatrick ed. 1991).
303. See Sacks, supra note 253, at 37 (pointing out that King’s Bench judges and
lawyers worried about their “loss of business” to courts of equity and prerogative
courts).
304. See FORMS OF NATIONHOOD, supra note 157, at 66 (offering the statement of
an observer that “the principal courts of the Common Law, had so little business that
the lawyers just stood and ‘looked about them’”).
305. See Sacks, supra note 253, at 37 (noting that the emergence of the legal
action in assumpsit was a desire created to attract plaintiffs in contract disputes).
306. See id. (explaining that judges, as well as lawyers, feared the Common Law
courts’ shrinking jurisdiction over transactional issues). Note that not only the
lawyers but also the judges were paid a fee for each case brought to them and hence
had a very direct interest in the popularity of their courts.
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impulsiveness, and the like. Skimming the above discussions again,
we can see that Coke did exactly that.307
In this light, the formation of a rule like the parol evidence rule is a
miniature of the larger story of building a new image for the
Common Law. Even though a contract is philosophically, an
unwritten creature, an abstract meeting point of minds, wills or
intentions, rather than a tangible document, the parol evidence rule
still reflects the fact that something is missing.308 By insisting on
writing, the rule seeks authority, which in turn derives from the solid
image of the written word.309
The Countess of Rutland’s Case should be read, therefore, as part
of a larger written cloak that covers the rules of interpretation of
contracts. As such, the Case should be read together with its better
known allies: Slade’s Case and Shelly’s Case. Jointly, they were part of
one big campaign, aimed at building a newer and better image of the
“rule of law” for the Common Law.310 The fact that all these cases
belong to Coke’s legacy and are all “contractual” should not be seen
as mere coincidence. In a period repeatedly characterized as based
on a “culture of credit” the demand for contracts and, as a result, for
contractual litigation and practical contract rules, was on the rise, and
contract law served as a “testing ground” for the law in general.311 In
other words, if contracts could be dealt with in a satisfactory manner
under the Common Law, in such a period of need, then the
achievement would be much greater and eventually exceed the
contractual arena.312 The achievement would bring more business to
the Common Lawyers and judges and it would reflect and signify the
law’s majestic power of being systematic, rational, organized,
predictable, and useful.313 The success of this marketing campaign
307. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 121 (describing Coke’s desire
to avoid “obscurity, ambiguity, jeopardy, novelty, and prolixity” in favor of “bright-line
rules” and rigid interpretation of those rules).
308. See MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 47, at 33 (noting that, in the context of the
parol evidence rule, some scholars believe that a written contract is not the contract
itself—only evidence of the contract).
309. See id. at 32 (cautioning that the parol evidence rule only applies where the
contract is in writing).
310. See Sacks, supra note 253, at 37-38 (suggesting that the “winning argument”
in Slade’s Case, for example, was an attempt to serve the client while creating
authoritative precedents for future contracts cases).
311. See id. at 36 (observing that during Henry VIII’s reign, debt litigation and
small business transactions were rapidly increasing in urban and rural areas).
312. See id. at 37-38 (noting that common law contract lawyers during this period
wished not only to create precedents, but also to “extend them as far as they could”).
313. See id. at 38 (suggesting that Coke’s report of these contract decisions “filled
the space left by the absence of a definitive statement of the court’s reasoning and
thereby fixed all future discussions of contracts”).
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would represent Coke’s victory, on behalf of his biggest client ever:
the Common Law.314
Surely the idea of gender stereotypes did not even cross Coke’s
mind at the time, but from a twenty-first century perspective, his
defense strategy might be seen as attributing a more masculine-like
image to the Common Law while concealing feminine features.
Again, but keeping gender in mind, it may be viewed as accrediting
stereotypically-masculine qualities of credibility, trustworthiness,
firmness, certainty, self-control, steadiness, and so on, while hiding
stereotypically feminine traits of capriciousness, haziness, instability,
irrationality, unpredictability, impulsiveness, and the like. Such an
observation raises two major questions with respect to the move from
the “feminine” to the “masculine” as described above: first, about the
hegemonic rejection of the womanly qualities of the law and second,
about the artificiality of the whole transformation.
The first point is quite straightforward. I explored it earlier when I
offered a close reading of Coke’s heavily quoted text. Being
detached, patronizing, authoritative, rational, commercial, and full of
certainty, the parol evidence rule may serve as a silencing mechanism
of more womanly voices.
Pertaining to the point of artificiality, to ascribe a more masculinelike image to the Common Law was an artificial move rather than a
deep conversion. To write the precedents, to switch from oaths to
juries and to use artificial reason was to put on a manly mask and
clothes that would hide the more stereotypically feminine sides of the
law. When Coke wrote the report of our Case and formed the
contractual rule that gave priority to writings he did just that: he wrote
a play in which the Common Law had the leading role and he dressed
the Common Law as a man.
2. Portia’s Efforts
Even though he probably did not meet William Shakespeare in
person, Coke was certainly familiar with his play The Merchant of
Venice, so popular in the years preceding the Case.315 Generally, as
314. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 123-24 (explaining that Coke
constantly “asserted the superiority of the common law” and made numerous
categorical claims in support of his position).
315. See MARK EDWIN ANDREWS, LAW VERSUS EQUITY IN THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 21
(1965).
The Merchant of Venice was written before 1598, for it is one of the six
comedies specifically mentioned by Meres in his Palladis Tamia in 1598. It
was very probably written after 1596 for in that year Sylvain’s Orator, a book
which contained part of the argument of the bond plot, was published in
English translation; Thus, the conclusion that the play was presented for the
first time late in the year 1596 or in 1597.
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Luke Wilson said, it “seems beyond dispute that the meaning of
contractual relations was a matter of particular concern at least
roughly at the same time as the drama flourished in the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries.”316 More specifically, at least one
early study of the legal scene in the fourth act of this famous play
claimed that, “If I were asked to name the three men in all England
who were most profoundly affected by Shakespeare’s The Merchant
of Venice, I should unhesitatingly name the following: Sir Edward
Coke, Sir Thomas Egerton . . . and Sir Francis Bacon.”317
Whether inspired by Shakespeare’s Portia or on his own initiative,
Coke can be perceived as using the parol evidence rule in a manner
parallel to Shakespeare’s use of Portia’s gender-bending.
In The Merchant of Venice, Portia disguises herself as a male lawyer
in order to give a cunning speech, a feat of rationalism, in favor of
Antonio, “the merchant,” against Shylock, “the Jew.”318
This
disguise—and it alone—invests her with the elevated status of a
lawyer, the respect of others, and eventually grants her the power of
persuasion, admiration, and prestige.319 Only in the disguise of the
“articulated lawyer,” that is to say, of a brilliant doctor of law, can she
determine things with decisiveness.320 Only as a man, and through
“male” intellectual slyness, can she appear as one who knows and
defeat Shylock.321 If she had presented herself in her femininity and
spoken through her true, emotional, and romantic motives (to save
Antonio in order to recapture her love and new husband, Bassanio)
—would she have succeeded? Not likely. Support for this estimation
may be found in Portia’s memorable speech in which she praises the
quality of mercy, a stereotypically female quality.322 Her failure to
Id. Andrews’s fascinating work was completed in 1935 but was published only years
later in 1965. According to him, the play was first printed in 1600 and his book
contains a beautiful reproduction of the title page of this first quarto edition.
316. WILSON, supra note 195, at 70-71.
317. See ANDREWS, supra note 315, at 21 (emphasis in bold letters added); see also
id. at 23 (referring to the rivalry between the common law and equity, and suggesting
that “Act IV, Scene i, of the play does not depict a legal quibble, as is often said, but is
a profound study of the greatest judicial problem of English jurisprudence which was
at its controversial height when The Merchant of Venice was written”).
318. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 126 (Randall Martin ed.,
Applause Theatre Books, 2001) (1598).
319. See id. at 140 (revealing the Duke’s admiration for the disguised Portia when
the farmer says to Antonio: “[g]ratify this gentleman, [f]or in my mind you are much
bound to him”).
320. See id. at 136-38 (focusing on Portia’s use of legalisms and logic as she
explains Venetian criminal law to Shylock).
321. See id. at 138 (demonstrating Portia’s decisive victory over Shylock by
ordering him to kneel and beg the Duke for mercy).
322. See id. at 126-28 (Act Four, Scene One) (presenting Portia’s discussion of
mercy, which she likens to “gentle rain from heaven” and that is “twice blest”).
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alter the interpretation of the draconic loan contract by using a
feminine voice, albeit wrapped in a masculine costume, suggests a
view of what the appropriate gender performance is under law.
The loan bond stated that if Antonio did not redeem his debt,
Shylock could claim a fine consisting of a pound of flesh, “fair” flesh
to be cut and taken from Antonio.323 The “lesson” to be learned
from the rejection of Portia’s attempt to call for compassion and
benevolence is that in the interpretation of this commercial contract
there is no room for such “soft” emotions, but rather, only for that
which is termed law.324 Portia uses, then, the only recourse left to
her—she turns swiftly to the written words of the bond and reads
them in the most literal way while employing the shrewdness of
linguistic rationale.325 She holds fast to the language of the contract
and to the principle that all that is not explicitly permitted is,
therefore, forbidden. As the contract manifestly determines that the
fine is a pound of flesh, but does not say that the fine includes blood,
Shylock is allowed to collect his debt, but Portia warns him that he
must not shed even a drop of Antonio’s blood, or he will endanger his
property as well as his life.326 This sophisticated logical analysis is
what finally brings her the cries of admiration, “upright judge . . .
learned judge.”327
Indeed, Portia’s “intellectual” acrobatics are presented to the viewer
as the height of legal-contractual ability and as ensuring her
professional reverence. Holding to the written words and speaking
about their meaning in a rational manner is offered by Shakespeare as
a way of gaining both authority and success.328 Is this not the same
thing that Coke was trying to achieve for the Common Law? Is it not
what he was seeking while reporting the Countess of Rutland’s Case?
And, finally, does not Portia as well as the parol evidence rule present
323. See id. at 28. (Act One, Scene Three)
Shylock: . . . Go with me to a Notary, seal me there/ Your single bond, and,
in a merry sport,/ If you repay me not on such a day. . . let the forfeit/ Be
nominated for an equal pound/ Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken/
In what part of your body pleaseth me. Antonio: . . . I’ll seal to such a
bond,/ And say there is much kindness in the Jew.
Id.
324. See id. at 128 (Act Four, Scene One) (showing Shylock’s rejection of Portia’s
argument: “My deeds upon my head! I crave the law,/ The penalty and forfeit of my
bond.”).
325. See id. (Act Four, Scene One) (containing Portia’s request: “I pray you, let me
look upon the bond.”).
326. See id. at 134 (Act Four, Scene One) (discussing the terms of the bond, which
as Portia notes, allow the extraction of a pound of flesh but “no jot of blood”).
327. Id. (Act Four, Scene One).
328. See id. at 135 (noting that Portia succeeds only by “insist[ing] on the literal
tenor of the bond”) (editor’s commentary).
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an artificial image of rationalism, which conceals something far less
rational?
Having suggested this similarity, it is worth pointing to one major
difference between the writings of Shakespeare and Coke. While the
play’s audience recognizes Portia’s real identity and motives, this is
not true of the readers of the legal report. In contrast to theatergoers, these readers might not suspect, perhaps even today, that the
hierarchical and rigid parol evidence rule entails a disguise that hides
the real nature of contractual interpretation or that of the law at
large.
This disparity may offer a better appreciation of the legal rule. The
theater-goers not only know that Portia is not a man, that she is
bending her gender performance—they are also fully aware of the
active effort she is making to hide her true identity and to pretend to
be something that she is not.329 This act of imitating men, their
voice, their rough steps, their brags and lies, and their clothes,330 by
one who is originally “a woman fair, and fairer than that word,”331 is
significant. It exposes the artificial nature of her “masculine” speech
regarding the pound of flesh. This imitation is completely at odds
with the declared gender conception of the play, which reflects
traditional gender stereotypes, according to which “a maiden hath no
tongue, but thought.”332 The effect of the plain act of imitation
hence becomes dramatic: it is converted into an act of mockery and it
gains a subversive meaning. The loud and open simulation turns the
rational-logical-linguistic process of interpretation, as performed by
Portia, into a freak-show and it exposes its artificial nature.333
This imitation, the disguise, purporting to be something she is not,
undermines the unity of the masculine image of the law. It is true
that everyone admires Portia because she saved Antonio from
Shylock’s clutches, but does the deceit not leave us with an unsavory
taste? Is there anyone who senses that the loan contract was indeed
properly interpreted?334 The fact that Portia is not a “real” legal
329. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 318, at 127 (observing that the disguise is
obvious to the audience, but adding that the audience has little time to examine it
because she begins acting soon after taking the stage) (editor’s commentary).
330. See id. at 108 (Act Three, Scene Four) (containing Portia’s characterization
of men’s physical traits and behavior).
331. Id. at 10 (Act One, Scene One).
332. Id. at 34. (Act Three, Scene Two).
333. See Thomas Moisan, “Which is the Merchant Here? And Which is the Jew?”:
Subversion and Recuperation in The Merchant of Venice, in SHAKESPEARE
REPRODUCED: THE TEXT IN HISTORY & IDEOLOGY 188, 188 (Jean E. Howard & Marion F.
O’Connor eds., 1987) (observing that the imitations and ambiguities in the play “blur
the distinctions on which the polarities . . . depend”).
334. See STEWART MACAULY, JOHN KIDWELL, WILLIAM WHITFORD & MARC GALANTER,
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expert also reduces our belief in the legal outcome. Had Shakespeare
written about a real doctor of law who interpreted the contract, we
would perhaps have been more trustful. The disguise creates a
significant fracture in the rational legal façade and brings its
limitations to the front of the stage, in both senses of the phrase.335
And this, in my eyes, is the most important feminist contribution to
the matter at hand: when a woman imitates a man and acquires a
male image, she nevertheless remains a woman. As a consequence,
the image—which is originally an entirely masculine one—is imbued
with a new meaning, one which suggests a critical look at the
origin.336 In other words, there is a challenging and thought
provoking dimension to the activity of the copycat in a field, namely
the legal one, which was originally designed by actual men.337 The
“pretend man,” by her very appearance in the men’s arena, exposes
the artificial nature inherent in the binary division into male and
female professions, male and female literature, male and female
justice.338 Crossing the gender lines, even if in disguise, casts a
doubting light on the lines’ existence and threatens to erase them. If
all a woman needs to do in order to be a man is to dress up like one,
then all of the many filaments built upon the gender images are likely
to collapse.339
Returning from Venice to the interpretation of contracts in the real
courts of England, we may now see more clearly the motivations for
covering this process with the distinguished costume of the parol
CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION, VOL. 1, 696-67 (1995) (describing the Merchant of Venice
as the “classic illustration of creative interpretation” and as a way “to avoid an
undesired result” and than arguing that Portia’s reading of the bond is a
misinterpretation).
335. See GREENBLATT, supra note 27, at 192 (indicating this indeterminacy of
Shakespearean representation, which is always shifting).
336. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 136 (1990) (suggesting that “one
gender” may only be “a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of bodies,”
requiring a more nuanced inquiry into gender identity).
337. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 336, at 137 ("In imitating gender, drag implicitly
reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency."); see also
Zachary Potter & C.J. Summers, People and Antidiscrimination Law: Reconsidering,
Epistemology and Ontology in Status Identity Discourse: Make-Believe and Reality in
Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 113, 115 (2001)
(suggesting a theoretical framework that the authors name as “fictionalism” in order
to clarify and expand “upon the arguments in post-structural projects, such as Judith
Butler's deconstruction of the sex/gender binary”). In this context it is important to
recall that at the times of The Merchant of Venice no real female lawyer had ever
been seen. The cultural effect, perhaps even the shock, of seeing and listening to a
woman who acts like a lawyer, might be compared to the modern-day effect of seeing
Matthew Bourne's ground-breaking all-male "Swan Lake.”
338. See id. at 140 (cautioning against interpreting gender as a “subtle identity” or
“locus of agency from which various acts [predictably] follow”).
339. See id. at 137-38 (observing that cross-dressing and drag are popular ways to
parody society’s traditional beliefs that gender is rigid and permanent).
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evidence rule. Through these theater binoculars, we can see the
disguise as another act of marketing on the part of contract law in
order to sell itself and the ideological method within which it
operates. In order to be heard, contract law and Common Law at
large, like Portia, needed to assume the costume of a rational
expert.340 It seems that Shakespeare and Coke would have both
agreed that adhering to the written words of the contract would serve
as the best signifier of such rationality.341 The fact that Shakespeare
told his audience about the costuming, while Coke hid it from his
readers, further supports the argument that Coke was engaged in a
marketing campaign.
Nicolette
She lost her home.
The parol evidence rule ruled out her situation, her hardship, her
need to provide for the future of her only child, her dependence on
the man who loved her, her incapacity to affect the written
contractual words. Sure, nothing was personal. It is, after all, so she
was surely told, an established rule, four hundred years old, and back
then, in the old days, they did not know a thing about her, about
Hollywood, or about gender bias.342
And what if Isabel, the Countess of Rutland, could have heard
Nicolette’s story? Coming from a different age she probably could
not really understand what the term “gender bias” means or even
what gender is, but she surely could tell Nicolette much about her
experience: her hardship, her need to provide for the future of her
only child, her dependence on the man who loved her, and, lastly,
her incapacity to affect the written contractual words.343
CONCLUSION
Four hundred years have passed. And yet, it seems to me that so
little has changed. Indeed, one can doubt the practical significance of
the Rule, both then and now,344 or, the other way around, one can
340. See SIMPSON, LEADING CASES, supra note 277, at 35 (noting that judges may
respond forcibly to rational-sounding arguments while secretly basing their opinions
on political considerations).
341. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 121 (explaining that Coke
preferred the simplest, most literal reading of statutes and other written legal
languages).
342. See MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 47, at 10-11 (tracing the origins of the rule to
the late fifteenth century Norman England).
343. See id. at 30 (arguing that courts all too often apply the parol evidence rule
with very little regard to the real issues in the case or the rule’s effect on the parties).
344. See Zamir, supra note 208, at 1730-31 (analyzing a cluster of cases and
concluding that the rule has been reduced to a rhetorical device, “aimed at disguising
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admire the Rule’s contribution to the functionality of contract law
within the commercial sphere.345 However, when looking through
these women’s eyes—as this research and analysis have sought to do—
it becomes clear that the rule’s very presence, with all that it
represents, has inherently biased and injurious outcomes.
One may well admire Coke’s efforts to structure a rule of law in
times of trouble as well as his contribution to the stabilization of a
society in a time of change.346 But even so, through exposing the
roots of the Rule, I have argued that centuries later we should
reconsider the need for the tree that has sprouted.347 To my mind,
Nicolette, both as an individual and as a representative of our times,
should not have to suffer the misery of Isabel and her era.
Piecing together disparate historical and cultural materials, I have
attempted to portray the particular contexts of the birth of the very
rule that strives to avoid context. I have tried not to take the rule for
granted, not to accept its existence as natural or neutral. I have
treated Coke’s words in the Countess of Rutland’s Case along the
lines of New Historicism, as a textual unit about texts and their
importance and, more implicitly, about contexts and their exclusion.
The fact that after four centuries, this textual unit, which once
formed the parol evidence rule, has survived the changing times and
has played a continuous role in a shifting contractual doctrine is
extremely meaningful: it bridges Nicolette and Isabel’s stories and
transforms the journey taken here from a mere search for the past to
an exposure of a new understanding of the present.348 This journey
has, in a nutshell, the flavor of Foucault’s Genealogy: nothing that we
know today is simply here, and therefore, in order to better

the active role courts play in contract interpretation”); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1769 (2000) (stating
that “[t]he parol evidence rule, although not abandoned, has been significantly
loosened in two relevant respects under modern contract law”). Indeed, commenting
on an earlier draft of this article Prof. Gerald Frug noted that those who in modern
days follow Corbin (“soft parol evidence rule” in Posner’s terms) might have allowed
in the kind of evidence discussed here, both in Isabel and Nicolette’s stories. See
Letter from Gerald Frug, to author (Jul. 29, 2004) (on file with author).
345. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 590-92 (2003) (praising the Uniform Commercial
Code’s version of the parol evidence rule).
346. See BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 91, at 119-20 (providing a mixed and
ultimately lukewarm assessment of Coke’s role in crystallizing legal terminology and
establishing the privileged status of lawyers within the changing society).
347. See id. (arguing that “[i]f the law remained artificial reason, reason had
petrified within the artifice”).
348. See MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 47, at 2 (acknowledging the long and stoned
history of the parol evidence rule, and arguing that analyzing its historical
development allows for a better assessment of its relevance today).
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understand the meaning and necessity of the twenty-first century’s
parol evidence rule, we had better search from where it originated.349
My reading of the Case’s textual unit in and against its context
suggests that it played a double role: concurrently reflective and
productive, simultaneously passive and active, both a mirror and a
torch.350 On the one hand, through close reading of the text, I have
offered to view the text as inertly representing the values that were
highly admired within the legal culture of Coke’s days. On the other
hand, by exploring Coke’s motives, I have suggested observing this
text as an active player within the same legal culture, as one that was
intentionally designed to shape that legal culture.
I hope that a deeper acquaintance with the circumstances of the
birth of the parol evidence rule, as offered here, makes it possible to
better appreciate the motives that led to its formation. It is, after all, a
crucial advantage of the New Historicist practice: knowing the
particulars has the effect of de-mystifying the myth.351 My desire is
that from this same well informed standpoint, it will now be easier to
feel confident enough to admit the rule’s artificiality and biased
nature, and to reappraise its necessity. I also hope that this analysis
has produced a further argument, original and useful, against
excessive formalist textualism in present-day contract law.

349. Michel Foucault, Genealogy and Social Criticism, in THE POSTMODERN TURN:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL THEORY 39-45 (Steven Seidman ed., 1994).
350. See Moisan, supra note 333, at 188 (identifying similar dichotomies in the
theatrical works of Coke’s era, particularly The Merchant of Venice where one sees
“[o]ld law versus [n]ew law, [j]ustice versus [m]ercy, and [v]engence versus [l]ove”).
351. See GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 28, at 5-6 (rejecting the notion that
a “supreme model of human perfection” can exist, because even the most elaborate
and developed of cultures has inherent limitations on what it can accomplish).
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